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Misaligned Interests in Private Equity 
Jarrod Shobe∗ 
This Article examines the unique set of agency costs that arise from 
the separation of ownership and control in private equity funds. These 
funds operate without significant regulatory or legislative oversight. 
Instead, they are governed primarily by contractual arrangements 
between investors and managers that are poorly understood by legal 
scholars. This Article looks into the black box of these internal 
arrangements to provide a broad analysis of whether and how these 
contracts align or misalign the interests of investors and managers. It 
turns out that the compensation of managers, which is commonly thought 
to serve as the most powerful tool to align interests, is less effective than it 
appears on its face, and that its effectiveness depends on a number of 
variables, including the type of compensation structure used and how well 
a fund is performing. In light of the complexity of these incentives and 
how few mechanisms are built into private equity agreements to protect 
investors, it appears that many investors likely do not understand the 
extent of these agency costs. Considering the amount of value investors 
transfer to managers under these agreements and investors’ limited exit 
rights, it is worth investigating the unique agency costs created by this 
structure and exploring ways to improve the alignment of interests and 
make private equity a more transparent legal structure for investors. 
 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 1438 
I. BACKGROUND ON PRIVATE EQUITY STRUCTURES AND 
AGENCY COSTS ...................................................... 1444 
A. Fund Structures ......................................................... 1444 
B. Private Equity Firms and Agency Costs ....................... 1446 
II. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES .............................................. 1451 
A. Carried Interest Structure........................................... 1451 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
3.SHOBE.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017  9:10 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1438 
1. How carried interest is paid ................................. 1452 
2. Preferred Return ................................................. 1453 
3. Clawback Provisions ............................................ 1454 
4. Agency costs and carried interest ......................... 1455 
B. Alignment of Interests and the Structure of Carried 
Interest .................................................................... 1459 
1. Carried interest when performing well ................. 1460 
2. Carried interest when performing poorly ............. 1461 
3. Carried interest when performance is neutral ....... 1462 
4. Issues with the clawback ...................................... 1463 
5. The effect of the overall economy on incentives ... 1465 
C. Improving Carried Interest Terms to Align Incentives . 1466 
1. Fee transparency ................................................. 1467 
2. Disclosing where carried interest goes .................. 1468 
3. Eliminating the deal-by-deal waterfall .................. 1469 
4. Fixing clawbacks ................................................. 1470 
5. Netting returns across funds ................................ 1471 
6. Fixing the preferred return .................................. 1473 
D. Management Fees ...................................................... 1474 
E. Improving the Management Fee ................................. 1477 
F. The Manager’s Capital Interest ................................... 1478 
G. Summary of Economic Incentives .............................. 1480 
III. MANAGER REPUTATION AND INVESTOR EXIT RIGHTS... 1481 
A. Exit ........................................................................... 1482 
B. Reputation and Fund Performance ............................. 1484 
1. Reputation when performing poorly .................... 1484 
2. Reputation when performing well........................ 1485 
3. Reputation when performance is neutral .............. 1485 
C. Summary of Exit Rights ............................................. 1486 
CONCLUSION ................................................................. 1486 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As of 2014, private equity funds held $3.8 trillion of assets under 
management, and in 2014 alone these funds raised $495 billion of 
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new capital from investors.1 These funds have become a permanent 
fixture in the global investing landscape and now manage a substantial 
portion of the portfolios held by pensions, university endowments, 
nonprofits, and other large institutional investors. Despite their 
important and growing role in the economy and the controversy their 
fees have raised in the media and among politicians,2 private equity 
funds have received surprisingly little attention from legal scholars. 
Financial economists have spent considerable time studying fund 
performance and the relationships between funds and their portfolio 
companies, yet both financial and legal scholars have rarely looked 
inside the black box of these funds’ internal operations to study the 
details of the contractual agreements between investors and 
managers.3 Scholars have consequently not made a sustained attempt 
to examine the complicated set of agency costs created by private 
equity structures and how these costs are and are not ameliorated by 
 
 1. PREQIN, 2015 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL REPORT 
7 (2015). 
 2. See, e.g., Chris Flood, Calpers’ $5bn private equity bill, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2015, at 
1; Simon Clark, Pension Funds Lambaste Private-Equity Fees, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2014, 2:45 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/pension-funds-lambast-private-equity-firms-for-large-fees-
1416562426; Sheelah Kolhatkar, Trump Puts a Serious Wall Street Issue on the Table: Hedge Fund 
Carried Interest, BLOOMBERG POL. (Aug. 26, 2015, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-08-26/trump-puts-a-serious-wall-street-
issue-on-the-table-hedge-fund-carried-interest; Richard Rubin, Obama Attacks Carried Interest 
Again to Shrugs in Congress, BLOOMBERG POL. (May 12, 2015, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-05-12/obama-attacks-carried-interest-
again-to-shrugs-in-u-s-congress. 
 3. Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 80 (2005) 
[hereinafter Fleischer, Missing Preferred Return] (“Legal academics . . . myopically focus on the 
problem of agency costs in public companies.”); Kate Litvak, Venture Capital Limited 
Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation Arrangements, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 161, 
162 (2009) [hereinafter Litvak, Venture Capital LPAs] (noting the large body of scholarship 
discussing the relationship between fund managers and their portfolio companies, but the lack 
of a similar body of scholarship discussing the relationship between fund managers and 
investors); Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The 
Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 222 
(2009) (noting limitations on the public availability of information about private equity funds as 
a reason for a lack of study in this area); Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, Venture Capital and 
Other Private Equity: A Survey, 17 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 619, 641 (2011) (“Compared to the 
extensive literature on the contracts between VCs and their portfolio companies, the literature 
on the contracts between fund managers and their investors is relatively small.”); John Morley, 
The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 
123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1231 (2014) (discussing the lack of legal literature on investment funds 
generally, including private equity funds). 
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funds’ compensation structures, contractual provisions, and non-
contractual influences. 
This Article aims to fill the gap in the literature two ways. First, it 
provides a detailed qualitative analysis of the misalignment in interests 
that arises from unusual and poorly understood private equity 
compensation structures and other non-contractual influences, such 
as manager reputation. And second, it suggests ways to reform private 
equity structures to reduce agency costs and improve the alignment of 
interests in private equity. 
This Article begins from the premise that private equity funds face 
an issue common to almost all investments—the separation of 
ownership and control.4 The problem is as follows: investors turn their 
money over to managers who hold almost exclusive control over how 
that money is invested. Because managers’ interests are not always 
aligned with investors’ interests, this structure gives rise to agency 
costs.5 Private equity funds merit a separate analysis from more 
frequently studied public companies because they are structured very 
differently. This Article explains how private equity structures transfer 
significant value to managers and explores why this value is greater 
than it might initially appear. 
The few scholars who have written about fund manager 
compensation, especially carried interest (a structure in which 
managers are paid a percentage of a fund’s profits), have praised it as 
an effective tool for overcoming agency costs.6 Ideally, carried interest 
would provide sufficient incentive for managers to maximize investors’ 
returns in all circumstances. However, in practice, carried interest 
creates a complex set of hidden incentives and agency costs that 
scholars have overlooked.7 For example, much of the carried interest 
paid to managers does not go to those responsible for making 
investment decisions but rather to founders of these firms who are no 
 
 4. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933). 
 5. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy 
of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 49–50 (2006) (discussing agency costs in venture 
capital setting). 
 6. WILLIAM M. MERCER INC., KEY TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE EQUITY 
INVESTING 2 (1996) [hereinafter MERCER REPORT] (“The carried interest represents a financial 
alignment of interests.”). 
 7. Fleischer, Missing Preferred Return, supra note 3, at 79 (“[P]rivate equity 
compensation practices are largely unexplored in the legal literature.”). 
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longer engaged in the day-to-day operations, or even to the public 
through an IPO by a private equity management company.8 As the 
media played up in the 2012 elections, Mitt Romney continued to 
receive substantial payments of carried interest from subsequent Bain 
Capital funds many years after he left the firm.9 He received these 
payments even though he had no involvement in choosing and 
managing investments in these funds.10 In effect, a portion of 
investors’ carried interest in subsequent funds was paid to Romney for 
his performance in past funds rather than to the managers who were 
responsible for managing these subsequent funds. This Article argues 
that these types of arrangements significantly reduce the ability of 
carried interest to align incentives between current investors and 
current managers. 
Even when carried interest is paid to those responsible for making 
and managing investments, it only aligns interests in some 
circumstances, and misaligns in others, depending on issues that are 
rarely discussed, including the type of carried interest structure used 
and how well a fund is performing. It turns out that interests are most 
misaligned when a fund is performing poorly, but are also 
misaligned—albeit in different ways—when a fund is performing well. 
On top of carried interest, managers are also compensated 
through a management fee that is generally charged at a fixed rate on 
committed capital. Scholars have noted that because the management 
fee bears no relation to fund performance, it is a poor mechanism to 
align incentives.11 This Article shows that the interaction of carried 
interest and the management fee makes the incentives underlying the 
management fee more complicated and dependent on fund 
performance than has been commonly acknowledged. 
By addressing the subtleties of the economic arrangement 
between investors and managers, this Article provides a framework 
that allows us to begin to develop a more sophisticated understanding 
 
 8. See infra note 73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the recent phenomenon 
of taking a private equity management company public. 
 9. See Nicholas Confessore, Christopher Drew & Julie Creswell, Buyout Profits Keep 
Flowing to Romney, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at A1 (discussing Mitt Romney’s retirement 
agreement “that has paid him a share of Bain’s profits ever since” his retirement); Beth Healy & 
Michael Kranish, Romney kept reins, bargained hard on severance, BOS. GLOBE (July 20, 2012), 
http://archive.boston.com/news/politics/articles/2012/07/20/romney_kept_reins_bargain
ed_hard_on_severance/. 
 10. Confessore et al., supra note 9, at A20. 
 11. See infra Section II.D. 
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of ways to reduce agency costs in private equity funds. Reducing 
agency costs requires targeted changes to economic incentives that 
address the specific issues and structures causing the misalignment of 
interests. This Article explores ways in which the details of 
compensation in private equity funds could be altered so that it serves 
as a more effective tool to align the interests of managers and 
investors. These changes are likely to occur only if investors 
understand the economic incentives inherent in private equity 
arrangements. This Article also suggests a number of ways regulators 
could require private equity funds to increase their transparency so 
that investors better understand these economic incentives.  
In addition to the economic arrangement set out in the contracts 
between investors and managers, reputational concerns serve as an 
important non-contractual influence on managers’ incentives. Private 
equity funds have a limited life, which allows investors a form of exit 
by choosing not to invest in subsequent funds, although this exit right 
is infrequent and delayed.12 This aligns managers’ incentives with 
those of investors to a degree, since their reputation determines 
whether they will be able to successfully form subsequent funds. The 
incentives provided by reputation are in many cases similar to those 
provided by carried interest, since reputation is mostly synonymous 
with fund performance. This Article shows that, much like with 
carried interest, the incentives created by reputational concerns are 
variable and less effective at aligning interests than scholars have 
realized. The combination of incentives created by manager 
compensation and reputational concerns does not appear to be 
enough to eliminate the significant agency costs present in the private 
equity structure. 
Despite the agency costs present in private equity, lawmakers and 
regulators have created few governing rules and regulations to restrict 
managers’ discretion.13 The theory underlying this relative lack of 
 
 12. See Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 
298–99 (2009) [hereinafter Ribstein, Partnership Governance] (describing various incentives 
that managers face in private equity funds). 
 13. See generally Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan, Regulatory Harmonization and the 
Development of Private Equity Markets, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 3218, 3219 (2007) (“First, we 
study the effect of a comparative dearth of regulations of private equity funds on institutional 
investor allocations to private equity. The dearth or lack of regulations in private equity to which 
we refer is related to the fact that investors in private equity funds are institutional investors and 
high net worth individuals (not the so-called unsophisticated retail investors) and therefore these 
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regulation is that investors in these funds are sophisticated and 
therefore do not need governmental protection.14 The lack of 
legislative and regulatory intervention in private equity means that the 
constituent legal documents and non-contractual aspects of private 
equity funds serve a uniquely important role in governing the 
relationship between investors and managers. While detailed 
contractual agreements between sophisticated parties seem like a 
sensible substitute for costly corporate-type monitoring and 
regulatory systems, it is worth investigating how effective these 
substitutes are at aligning interests. It may be that the negotiation 
process and resulting agency costs are acceptable to investors. 
However, some large investors have recently changed their approach 
to investing in these funds by requiring managers to increase 
disclosure of fees, which indicates that a number of investors find the 
alignment of interest to be insufficient.15 Either way, we must first 
understand private equity agency costs in order to begin to understand 
whether investors account for them and how we can reduce them. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background on 
the nature of private equity funds and the agency costs that arise in 
these funds. Part II examines the compensation structures of private 
equity funds, explains how these structures create agency costs, and 
proposes ways compensation structures could be modified to reduce 
agency costs. Part III examines the role that investors’ exit rights play 
in managers’ incentives. 
 
funds do not receive the same degree of scrutiny as other types of retail based funds, such as 
mutual funds.”). 
 14. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.20(2) (7th ed. 
2016) (discussing the definition of accredited investor). This is in contrast to ordinary 
companies, where Congress and regulators have frequently intervened. For example, in an 
attempt to induce companies to pay executives in ways that are aligned with investor interests, 
Congress passed a law disallowing a deduction for any executive pay beyond one million dollars 
that is not linked to performance. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012); see also LUCIAN BEBCHUCK & 
JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 135 (2004). 
 15. Simon Clark, Dutch Pension Fund Demands Full Fee Disclosure From Private-Equity 
Firms, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2015, 4:35 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dutch-pension-
fund-demands-full-fee-disclosure-from-private-equity-firms-1438850122; see Gretchen 
Morgenson, Pension Funds Can Only Guess at Private Equity’s Cost, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/business/pension-funds-can-only-guess-at-private-
equitys-cost.html. 
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I. BACKGROUND ON PRIVATE EQUITY STRUCTURES AND 
AGENCY COSTS 
A. Fund Structures 
To begin, some background on basic fund organization is 
necessary. Private equity is an umbrella term that includes various 
types of funds with different investment strategies, such as real estate 
funds, debt funds, or venture capital funds that invest in start-up 
companies. The type of private equity funds that hold the greatest 
amount of capital by far are buyout funds, which buy controlling 
stakes in established companies of varying sizes. Because buyout funds 
are the largest segment of the private equity sector,16 this Article 
focuses primarily on the contractual arrangements found in these 
funds, which may differ somewhat from those found in venture capital 
and other types of funds. 
Private equity funds are most commonly organized as limited 
partnerships.17 The sponsor of a fund generally creates one entity to 
serve as the general partner of the fund and another entity that is not 
a partner in the fund to serve as the manager of the fund.18 For 
purposes of this Article, references to managers include both of these 
types of entities, since they are generally owned by the same group of 
people. Investors in a fund subscribe to interests in the fund, thereby 
becoming limited partners. This process also involves entering into a 
contract with the manager through a limited partnership agreement 
(LPA) that governs the relationship between all of the investors and 
the manager. By subscribing, investors commit to contribute a certain 
dollar amount when requested by the fund to pay fund expenses or 
 
 16. Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 REV. 
FIN. STUDIES 2303, 2303 (2010) (“About two-thirds of [private equity] capital is managed by 
buyout funds . . . .”). 
 17. JAMES M. SCHELL, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND 
OPERATIONS § 1.01 (2015); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical 
Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463, 469 (1996) (describing 
limited partnerships as “the dominant organizational form”). 
 18. This structure is mostly tax driven. The advantage of this structure is that the sponsor 
of the fund can ensure that the management fee is paid to the company operating its business, 
thereby allowing a deduction for operating expenses against the management fee. The purpose 
of this is to deduct expenses against the management fee, which is taxed at ordinary income 
rates. The carried interest, which is taxed at a lower rate, goes to the manager entity and passes 
directly through to the managers of the firm with no deduction for operating expenses. 
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acquire investments. Investors agree to pay two fees to the manager: 
a fixed management fee, generally based on the amounts committed 
to the fund,19 and carried interest based on a percentage of profits 
generated by the fund. 
Once a fund is formed, a manager has a number of years (usually 
between three and five)20 known as the “investment period,” in which 
to issue capital calls to investors requiring them to contribute capital 
to fund investments.21 These investments are known as “portfolio 
companies,” and a manager’s goal is to buy companies that are 
thought to be undervalued or that would benefit from changes to 
strategy or management. After a number of years, and before the end 
of the fund’s term, the manager must sell the fund’s portfolio 
companies or take them public through an IPO, hopefully at a 
substantial profit. A fund generally operates for a total of ten years, 
although fund agreements commonly allow this period to be extended 
by a number of years, mostly to wind up and liquidate existing 
investments.22 These are the very basics of fund structures and 
operations; more detail is provided below with respect to certain 
specific provisions. 
 
 19. As will be discussed later, the management fee is generally charged as a percentage of 
committed capital before the investment period ends. Private equity funds generally have around 
a ten-year life, but they are allowed to make investments only during the first five years of the 
life of the fund, and this five-year period is the investment period. After the investment period 
ends, it is common for the management fee to be lowered and charged based on invested capital 
rather than committed capital. The theory is that the manager is less busy in the second half of 
the life of the fund since all investments have been made and that once an investment has been 
disposed of, a manager no longer needs to receive a fee with respect to the capital used to make 
the disposed investment. 
 20. See SCHELL, supra note 17, § 2.04. 
 21. Joseph Bankman & Marcus Cole, The Venture Capital Investment Bust: Did Agency 
Costs Play a Role? Was it Something Lawyers Helped Structure?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 216 
(2001) (“Under a capital call commitment, limited partners are obligated to forward specified 
amounts of capital whenever the general partners issue a capital call.”). 
 22. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 3, at 222 (noting that virtually all private equity funds 
are established for ten year terms); David Rosenberg, The Two “Cycles” of Venture Capital, 28 J. 
CORP. L. 419, 426 (2003) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Two Cycles) (noting also that private equity 
funds are usually established for ten year terms). Managers are generally able to extend this for 
additional one year periods, with limited partner consent. See SCHELL, supra note 17, § 11.02 
(“Most agreements governing private equity funds will set out a procedure under which the 
basic term can be extended for two or three one-year periods without a formal amendment.”). 
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B. Private Equity Firms and Agency Costs 
The question this Article addresses is similar to one that has 
occupied an important part of economic and corporate law scholarship 
for decades: What are the agency costs that arise as a result of the 
separation of ownership and management, how do they arise, and how 
can investors minimize them? Agency costs arise in private equity 
when investors provide money to a manager and then delegate control 
of how that money is invested to the manager, as agent.23 A manager’s 
interests are, in many instances, not aligned with investors’ interests as 
managers have incentives to use their delegated authority and inherent 
information asymmetries to act in ways contrary to investors’ best 
interests.24 Investors can use various mechanisms to attempt to compel 
a manager to act in accordance with investor interests as a way of 
reducing agency costs.25 Scholarship on agency costs is abundant, but 
has focused primarily on the relationships between managers and 
shareholders in public corporations.26 
Agency cost theory has only rarely been used to analyze 
relationships between investors and managers in private equity firms.27 
Legal scholars and economists have discussed the ways private equity 
funds are able to reduce agency costs between managers and the 
companies they acquire.28 However, the agency costs internal to 
 
 23. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (describing, in this 
classic article on the topic, the relationship between investor and manager as one “under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.”); 
see also Bartlett, supra note 5, at 49 (“Agency relationships are created among contracting parties 
because one party (the agent) will ordinarily hold discretionary and unobservable 
decisionmaking power to affect the wealth of another (the principal).”). 
 24. See, e.g., PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 158 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
 25. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 23, at 308. 
 26. Bartlett, supra note 5, at 50. 
 27. See sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 28. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010); Elisabeth de 
Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 130 (2013) 
(“Private equity minimizes the severe agency costs that exist with public company management 
as a result of the separation of ownership (by dispersed shareholders) and control (by hired 
management).”); Ronald J. Gilson, Understanding the Choice Between Public and Private Equity 
Financing of Early Stage Companies: A Comment on Barry and Turki, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 123, 127–29 (1998) [hereinafter Gilson, Choice Between Public and Private Equity]; 
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private equity funds are different because of the unique contractual 
relationship between investors and managers. Those who have studied 
agency costs between investors and fund managers have done so at a 
relatively superficial level, without considering how the details of 
private equity contractual arrangements increase or decrease agency 
costs.29 To reduce these costs, we must first understand them.  
Agency costs can be reduced in various ways, including through 
regulation, private contracting, and non-contractual influences like 
reputational concern.30 Courts, legislatures, and regulators can 
establish formal legal rules that apply broadly to reduce these costs.31 
The principal and agent can also enter into their own formal contracts 
that address these issues by binding the principal to behave in certain 
ways.32 There are also non-legal incentives like reputation that can 
align the incentives of the principal and agent.33 Every type of business 
relies on some combination of these incentives, and private equity 
firms are no exception. Private equity firms, however, are mostly 
exempt from formal legal rules that would constrain their behavior,34 
with only rare regulatory intervention from the SEC. Instead, the 
government appears to have chosen to let private ordering determine 
 
William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. 
ECON. 473 (1990); D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133 (1998); Bartlett, supra note 5, at 49–50 (2006) (discussing 
agency costs in venture capital setting); Fleischer, Missing Preferred Return, supra note 3, at 81 
(“In recent years economists have written literally hundreds of articles about venture capital, 
though few articles examine agency costs at the fund level.”). 
 29. See sources cited supra note 3 (examples of the articles that have discussed agency 
costs at a relatively superficial level). 
 30. See Ann E. Conaway, Lessons to Be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom to Contract in 
Delaware’s Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 789 (2008); Bartlett, supra note 5, at 51–56. 
 31. John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW 39 (2d ed. 2009); Conaway, supra note 30, at 814–15 (describing how agency 
costs can be reduced through contractual arrangements). 
 32. Armour et al., supra note 31, at 23. 
 33. Id. at 42–44. 
 34. See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND 
PRIVATE EQUITY CONTRACTING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 102 (2d ed. 2014) 
(discussing the relative lack of regulation of private equity funds); EILEEN APPELBAUM & 
ROSEMARY BATT, CTR. ECON. & POL’Y RES., A PRIMER ON PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK: 
MANAGEMENT, EMPLOYMENT, AND SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2012) (“Private equity is a lightly 
regulated financial intermediary that provides an alternative investment mechanism to the 
traditional banking system.”). 
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the agency costs in these funds by allowing them to rely primarily on 
formal contracts between managers and investors and reputational 
constraints on managers. 
LPAs govern the relationships between investors and private 
equity fund managers and contain a number of compensation and 
non-compensatory provisions that are intended to address agency 
costs. Investors frequently have the right to vote to liquidate a fund 
early under a clause commonly found in LPAs known as a “no-fault 
divorce” clause.35 However, these clauses are rarely invoked by 
investors because they require approval of a significant majority of 
investors and sufficient investor monitoring to raise the issue in the 
first place.36 Other LPA provisions explicitly prohibit self-dealing and 
require managers to spend a certain percentage of their time working 
for the fund, but these provisions are difficult to enforce and 
monitor.37 Managers also have fiduciary duties, although these can be 
waived in an LPA or subscription documents,38 and most believe that 
these duties do not do enough to reduce agency costs in these funds.39 
The non-compensatory aspects of LPAs therefore cannot be expected 
to do all the work in reducing agency costs. 
 
 35. See SCHELL, supra note 17, § 11.04. 
 36. See Morley, supra note 3, at 1254 n.60. 
 37. See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 24, at 157–63 (discussing other types of 
provisions that are intended to reduce agency costs, including various restrictions on how, and 
how much, managers can invest as well as provisions that disallow certain actions that a manager 
could use to benefit herself to the detriment of investors). 
 38. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Private Equity’s Curtain, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/business/retirement/behind-private-equitys-
curtain.html?_r=0 (noting that a private equity fund’s limited partnership agreement can “reduce 
or eliminate the duties, including fiduciary duties to the fund and the limited partners to which 
the general partner would otherwise be subject . . . .”); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-
1101(d) (applying to LPs), 18-1101(c) (applying to LLCs) (2013) (examples of Delaware 
limited partnership (LP) and limited liability corporation (LLC) statutes allowing these entities 
to waive many of their fiduciary duties); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and 
Corporate Indeterminacy, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 163 (2009) (explaining that Delaware courts 
rely on theories of contractual interpretation rather than stronger fiduciary duties when 
examining the conduct within partnerships, consequently allowing parties’ to avoid “the 
instability and indeterminacy of corporate fiduciary jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 39. Fleischer, Missing Preferred Return, supra note 3, at 96 (“Fiduciary duties do not 
provide a strong incentive to work hard. . . . The business decisions of GPs are effectively 
insulated from court review.”). 
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LPAs, by nature, also do not provide much voice to investors.40 In 
private equity funds, managers have substantial authority to run the 
affairs of funds and investors have very limited opportunity to 
intervene. Corporate entities have independent boards of directors 
that are elected by shareholders and whose role is to monitor managers 
to ensure that they are acting in ways that further shareholders’ 
interests.41 Private equity funds, on the other hand, have nothing more 
than an “advisory committee” that is able to consult with the manager, 
but has little actual authority to control a fund’s activities.42 Indeed, 
the nature of the limited partnership structure that is used by most 
private equity funds does not allow limited partners to play a 
significant role in managing the fund without running the risk of 
losing their limited liability.43 
Managers have economic interests in private equity funds both 
through carried interest and their own capital share in a fund, and 
these economic interests can both increase and reduce agency costs.44 
 
 40. For a discussion of the effects of voice on the relationships within organizations, see 
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 41. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 561–63 (2003); Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, 
Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129 (2009). 
 42. DIANE MULCAHY, BILL WEEKS & HAROLD S. BRADLEY, WE HAVE MET THE 
ENEMY . . . AND HE IS US 42 (2012) (“Unlike a regular Board, the Advisory Board generally 
does not meet independently, has no ongoing oversight responsibilities (e.g., approving budgets 
or compensation, or overseeing an audit), and has very limited (if any) approval rights . . . .”); 
Morley, supra note 3, at 1255. 
 43. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 
§ 302 cmt. (2001); see also Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
259, 274–75 (2010). There are also restrictions on certain types of foreign governments, 
commonly known as Section 892 investors because of the Internal Revenue Code section that 
grants them tax exempt status. These restrictions do not allow them to participate in the 
management of the fund if they want to qualify for a safe harbor to avoid “commercial activity” 
income. This is important to these investors because if they were to realize this type of income, 
they could jeopardize their tax-exempt status. See Income of Foreign Governments and 
International Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 68119 (proposed Nov. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 602). 
 44. See Lloyd L. Drury, III, Publicly-Held Private Equity Firms and the Rejection of Law 
as a Governance Device, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 57, 85 (2013) (“This element of incentive 
compensation strongly encourages managers to maximize the profitability of the firm.”); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1089–90 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson, Engineering Venture Capital 
Market]; Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 12, at 298 (“[M]anagers are motivated 
by high-powered incentive compensation.”). 
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Ordinary companies commonly attempt to reduce agency costs by 
structuring executive compensation in ways that provide incentives to 
enhance shareholder value, generally through stock options.45 This 
type of executive compensation has certain costs and benefits, and 
various scholars have analogized private equity manager compensation 
to stock options.46 This framework is helpful and advances our 
understanding of private equity manager compensation, but, as this 
Article will show, it does not go far enough in explaining the 
additional complexity of potentially misaligned incentives unique to 
private equity arrangements.  
Reputational concerns work in tandem with economic incentives 
and are a key factor in reducing agency costs.47 Reputation is an 
important non-contractual mechanism to constrain manager behavior 
because of the limited life of private equity funds. A good reputation 
allows managers to raise subsequent funds, possibly at higher dollar 
amounts. A bad reputation allows investors to exit, albeit in a delayed 
manner over which they have little control.48 While a manager may 
have a contractual or legal ability to act in ways that favor itself over 
investors, this reputational concern may restrain them from doing so. 
Most scholars have come to the conclusion that compensation 
terms and reputational concerns are the primary means by which 
private equity funds align the interests of investors and managers, and 
that other legal and contractual limits on manager behavior generally 
provide very little alignment of interests.49 This Article agrees that 
compensation terms and reputational concerns do most of the work 
in reducing agency costs in private equity funds, but shows that in 
many instances they are less effective at reducing agency costs than 
these scholars have concluded.  
 
 45. See LUCIAN BEBCHUCK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 137 (2004). 
 46. Heather M. Field, The Return-Reducing Ripple Effects of the “Carried Interest” Tax 
Proposals, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 16–19 (2012); Fleischer, supra note 3, at 97–100; Sahlman, supra 
note 28, at 496–99. 
 47. See infra Part III. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Gilson, Choice Between Public and Private Equity, supra note 23, at 127; Gilson, 
Engineering Venture Capital Market, supra note 44, at 1089–90; Masulis & Thomas, supra note 
3, at 251–54; David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of 
Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 390–91 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Venture 
Capital Limited Partnerships]. 
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II. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
This Part examines how private equity contractual provisions align 
investor and manager interests in some cases and misalign them in 
others. It focuses on the compensation aspects of LPAs, because these 
are generally agreed to be the most important means of aligning 
managers’ and investors’ interests. By now, the basics of private equity 
compensation are a familiar topic. Fund managers are paid through 
the well-known “two-and-twenty” compensation scheme,50 with two 
referring to the two percent fixed management fee and twenty 
referring to the twenty percent carried interest on fund profits. 
However, the details of how exactly these forms of compensation are 
earned and distributed, and the incentives they create, remain murky 
to many observers. This Part explains the details of both of these 
components of manager compensation and illustrates the complexity 
and variability of the incentives inherent in them. 
A. Carried Interest Structure 
Some background on how carried interest works is necessary to 
understanding the incentives it creates. Carried interest is generally 
charged as a set fee, almost always twenty percent of profits.51 Carried 
interest is especially valuable to managers because it is structured as a 
profits interests in the fund, meaning that it is treated as capital gains 
to the managers, allowing them to pay taxes at a preferential rate. The 
most salient—and therefore the most discussed and best understood—
feature of carried interest is the percentage charged. However, as this 
section shows, calculating and distributing carried interest is not as 
straightforward as it appears and the complexity involved in 
calculating and distributing carried interest, and how a fund recaptures 
 
 50. See Fleischer, Missing Preferred Return, supra note 3. 
 51. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 16, at 2311 (“The overwhelming majority of all 
funds—including all 144 [buyout] funds—use 20% as their carry level.”). In rare cases, especially 
well-respected managers may be able to charge a higher fee, although this is more common in 
the venture fund area. See SCHELL, supra note 17, § 2.02. Some managers also charge a tiered 
fee, where returns up to a certain amount are charged carried interest at one rate, while returns 
above that amount are charged at a higher rate. For example, the rate could be 20% up to a 20% 
rate of return to investors, after which it rises to 30%. 
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amounts that turn out to be overpayments to a manager, is where 
many of the agency problems in compensation arise.52 
1. How carried interest is paid 
While carried interest seems fairly simple on its surface, 
complications arise in determining how much a manager should be 
paid, and when. There are a number of ways to draft the distribution 
provisions that determine when carried interest is paid. This Article 
focuses on the two most popular modes of distribution: a return-of-
all capital waterfall (also known as a “European” waterfall because it 
has traditionally been more common in European funds) and a deal-
by-deal waterfall (also known as an “American” waterfall because it 
has traditionally been more common in U.S. funds).53 
A return-of-all capital waterfall requires a fund to distribute all 
proceeds to investors until they have received a return of all their 
invested capital. Only after investors have received this amount does 
the manager begin to receive its share of carried interest.54 This 
waterfall structure virtually guarantees that the manager will not 
receive any carried interest payments from a fund until relatively late 
in the fund’s life cycle, since it is likely that the fund will need to 
liquidate a significant portion of its investments before the manager 
receives any carried interest.55 This structure also makes overpayments 
of carried interest to the manager unlikely, such that a clawback 
provision requiring the manager to return carried interest becomes 
 
 52. There is also some debate on the basis to which carried interest is applied. The main 
points of contention are whether to deduct the management fee and organizational expenses 
when determining the basis to which the carried interest rate is applied. The market seems to 
have moved toward including these expenses, although there is still variation. SCHELL, supra 
note 17, § 2.02. 
 53. See generally SCHELL, supra note 17, § 2.04. 
 54. For example, suppose an investor contributed $200 to purchase two different 
investments for $100 each. One year later, the fund sells the first investment for $150. In this 
waterfall, 100% of the proceeds from the sale of the first investment would go to the investor, 
since they had not yet received a return of all their capital, even though the return on the first 
investment far exceeds the preferred return on that particular investment. 
 55. It is possible, but unlikely, that a few early investments may generate large returns that 
are big enough to pay back all of the investors’ capital early in the life of a fund. 
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much less important to ensuring that the intended economic 
arrangement is realized.56 
A deal-by-deal waterfall generally looks only at investments that 
have been liquidated to date for purposes of determining whether to 
distribute carried interest to the manager. As each investment is sold, 
investors receive the amounts they invested for that particular 
investment and any other previously liquidated investments for which 
they have not already received a full repayment. After these amounts 
have been distributed, any remaining profit on these realized 
investments is divided between investors and the manager, regardless 
of the performance of unliquidated investments or whether investors 
have received a return of all of their invested capital.57 This waterfall 
structure results in the manager receiving carried interest much earlier 
in a fund’s life, before it is clear whether, and to what extent, the fund 
as a whole will be profitable.58 As is discussed in detail in the following 
subsections, the differences between the two main types of waterfalls 
are extremely important in determining how much and when the 
manager will be paid by a fund, and therefore in determining a 
manager’s incentives. 
2. Preferred return 
Private equity funds commonly pay carried interest to managers 
only after investors have received a “preferred return” on the amounts 
 
 56. A clawback only arises in rare circumstances in a European-style waterfall, like when 
a fund conducts a follow-on investment or when there are drawdowns for fund expenses late in 
the life of the fund. 
 57. This type of waterfall generally requires the fund to distribute to investors until they 
have received the amounts used to fund any unrealized investments that have been permanently 
written-down, along with a portion of their capital contributions used for fees and expenses. See 
Cesar Estrada & Jonathan Karen, On Waterfalls, in THE FUND ADMINISTRATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY COMPENDIUM 13, 15 (2012). 
 58. For example, assume the same facts as above in supra note 54, where an investor 
contributed $200 that the fund used to purchase two different investments for $100 each. Under 
a deal-by-deal waterfall, the sale of the first investment one year later for $150 would be 
distributed with the first $100 to the investor to pay back the capital contributions used to fund 
the first investment, then $8 to the investor as a preferred return. Assuming a 100% catch-up to 
the manager, the manager would then get $2. The remaining $40 would be split 80/20, with 
$32 going to the investor and $8 to the manager. The manager ends up with $10 of carried 
interest even though the investor has only recovered $140 of its $200 invested capital. It is still 
possible at this point that the second investment will drop in value such that the manager should 
have received less, or no, carried interest. 
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they have invested, usually eight percent, compounded annually.59 The 
idea behind the preferred return is that managers should be paid 
carried interest only for exceptional performance. The accrual of a 
preferred return means that if an investor contributes $1000 to a 
private equity fund for a ten-year period at an eight percent preferred 
return, the fund must return $2,160 to that investor before the 
manager is entitled to any carried interest. Of course the reality is more 
complicated than this because investors make contributions at various 
times throughout the life of a fund and managers generally make 
distributions as each portfolio investment is sold. This adds complexity 
to both the waterfalls described above. For the return of all capital 
waterfall, it requires the manager to return not only the investors’ 
capital before receiving carried interest, but also their preferred return 
on that amount. For the deal-by-deal waterfall, the manager is 
generally required to return both the capital for, and the preferred 
return on, realized investments. As the preferred return accrues, the 
manager’s entitlement to carried interest can change significantly, and 
can even require the manager to return earlier distributions.  
3. Clawback provisions 
Private equity LPAs generally include a clawback provision 
requiring managers to pay back amounts of carried interest that 
exceed what they should have received under the intended economic 
arrangement.60 A clawback obligation generally arises where the 
manager receives amounts of carried interest that are attributable to 
early successful investments, and these successful investments are 
followed by losses or subpar gains.61 A clawback is most important in 
a deal-by-deal waterfall, where early distributions that turn out to be 
overpayments to the manager are much more likely to occur. 
Clawbacks traditionally are implemented at the end of the life of a 
 
 59. See Stephanie R. Breslow & Phyllis A. Schwartz, Structuring Waterfall Provisions, 
PRAC. L.J. 31, 35 (2011). 
 60. Gilson, Engineering Venture Capital Market, supra note 44, at 1089 (arguing that 
the clawback reduces agency costs because it allows managers’ compensation to be “calculated 
in total after performance is known”). 
 61. Even where gains are followed by gains, the accrued preferred interest can reduce 
the amount of carried interest that should have been paid to a manager, especially if there are 
gains very early in the fund but the preferred interest has a chance to compound over many 
subsequent years. 
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fund, after all investments have been liquidated and all returns are 
accounted for.62 Because funds generally have a life of ten years, this 
can result in a significant timing difference between when the 
manager receives carried interest and when it is required to pay it 
back, and during this period interest does not accrue on 
overpayments, meaning that it is, in effect, an interest-free loan from 
the investors to the manager.63 
LPAs sometimes include provisions intended to reduce the risk of 
overpayments of carried interest or the length of the interest-free loan 
from investors to managers that overpayments create. For example, 
some LPAs include an interim clawback that is calculated at the middle 
of a fund’s life to reduce the timing advantage to managers.64 LPAs 
may also require escrow accounts for a portion of the manager’s 
carried interest, which is generally not released until investors have 
received all of their capital back plus the preferred return.65 
Typically, there are limits on the amounts managers have to pay 
back under a clawback. Clawback provisions are commonly limited to 
the amount of carried interest distributed minus taxes paid, at an 
assumed rate.66 This means that investors may have to bear the portion 
of the clawback attributable to the manager’s taxes, putting them in a 
worse position than if the money had never been distributed to the 
manager at all.67 
4. Agency costs and carried interest 
Debates about carried interest have focused primarily on amounts 
of carried interest and the desirability of the tax treatment of this type 
of compensation structure rather than the agency costs that arise from 
 
 62. SCHELL, supra note 17, § 2.04. 
 63. Litvak, Venture Capital LPAs, supra note 3, at 176. 
 64. SCHELL, supra note 17, § 2.04. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See ANDREW W. NEEDHAM, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS, 735 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO 
(BNA) § III.B.4 (3d ed. 2011); Alan J. Pomerantz, Example of Distribution/Clawback 
Provisions, 541 PRACTISING L. INST. REAL EST. L. & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 
191, 193 (2007); Field, supra note 46, at 26 (discussing the fact that the assumed rate is 
generally an assumed rate). 
 67. Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests: The Reform that Did Not Happen, 
40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 197, 205 (2009) (providing a useful explanation as to why an incomplete 
clawback can hurt investors). 
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it.68 The media has frequently made an issue of the amounts private 
equity funds earn for their managers at the cost of pension funds, 
endowments, and non-profits.69 Scholars, however, commonly praise 
carried interest for aligning investors’ and managers’ interests, to the 
point that some have even referred to it as “magic.”70 This section digs 
deeper into how carried interest affects managers’ incentives under 
various conditions and shows that carried interest creates a 
complicated, variable set of incentives that deserve a more complete 
analysis. First, it shows that who gets carried interest affects incentives 
in important ways. Second, it demonstrates that there are many ways 
in which carried interest may increase agency costs, or reduce agency 
costs less than commonly assumed. Finally, it shows that agency costs 
exist both when a fund’s assets are performing well and when they are 
performing poorly, but these costs are greater when a fund is 
performing poorly. 
 a. Where does the carried interest go? Commentators commonly 
discuss carried interest as being paid to managers generally, without 
looking deeper into who actually receives these payments. A private 
 
 68. For a discussion of the reasons why carried interest should be taxed as ordinary income 
rather than capital gains, see Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in 
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008). There have been a number of proposals 
in Congress to change the taxation of carried interest. See, e.g., American Jobs Act of 2011, H.R. 
12, 112th Cong. § 412 (2011); American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 
4213, 111th Cong. § 412 (2010). 
 69. Simon Clark, Pension Funds Lambast Private-Equity Fees, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2014, 
2:45 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/pension-funds-lambast-private-equity-firms-for-
large-fees-1416562426; Victor Fleischer, Stop Universities From Hoarding Money, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/19/opinion/stop-universities-from-
hoarding-money.html. 
 70. Sahlman, supra note 28, at 494 (“The compensation system plays a critical role in 
aligning the interests of the venture capitalists and the limited partners.”); Field, supra note 46, 
at 35 (“Carried interests, as currently designed, generally are regarded as quite effective at 
aligning the incentives of the GP with the incentives of the LPs.”); Robert C. Illig, The Promise 
of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor 
Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV. 41, 70–73 (2008) [hereinafter Illig, Promise of Hedge Fund 
Governance]; Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, supra note 49, at 390–91 
(noting that managers’ and investors’ concerns are aligned “to a great extent by making the 
general partner’s compensation dependent on the success of the firms in the partnership’s 
portfolio”); Gilson, Engineering Venture Capital Market, supra note 37, at 1089 (noting that 
the “compensation structure aligns the GP’s interests in the fund’s success with those of the 
investors”); Matthew A. Melone, Success Breeds Discontent: Reforming the Taxation of Carried 
Interests – Forcing a Square Peg into a Round Hole, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 421 (2008). 
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equity manager is actually an entity full of professionals of differing 
rank and seniority, which makes the division of carried interest 
complicated. Employees responsible for the day-to-day operations of 
a fund receive a portion of the carried interest in every case, but that 
portion can be much smaller than the whole amount, which reduces 
the incentive power of carried interest. This is especially likely in 
successful funds that have been around for many years, because they 
have a number of senior managers with large ownership percentages 
of the manager entity. It is common for these managers to become 
less involved as they get older, but this does not mean they leave their 
economic interests in the fund behind.71 A prominent example of this 
is Mitt Romney. As became clear during his presidential candidacy, 
Romney, as a founding partner of Bain Capital, continued to receive 
substantial payments of carried interest from subsequent Bain funds 
many years after he had any association with the firm.72  
Recall that each fund is its own entity with its own set of investors 
and generally terminates after ten years, at which point a new fund is 
up and running, often with a very different set of investors. This means 
that investors in existing funds are paying persons who have no, or 
little, active association with their investment. These payments are 
effectively the equity share in the brand these retired or less engaged 
managers helped create, but it is hard to argue that these payments are 
aligning the interests of current investors with those currently making 
and managing investments in any meaningful way. 
There is another important way that investors’ payment of fees 
does not result in an alignment of interests. Managers of many of the 
largest and most prominent private equity firms have recently found a 
way to cash out their interests in future fund income by taking the 
management companies of their private equity firm’s public.73 These 
 
 71. MULCAHY, supra note 42, at 41 (“Cash compensation and carry allocations that 
implicitly (or explicitly) reward seniority and tenure at the firm rather than track record can give 
firm owners the lion’s share of fee income and management company profits, but do little to 
recruit, motivate, or retain promising junior partners and principals.”). 
 72. See Confessore, supra note 9, at A1 (discussing Mitt Romney’s retirement agreement 
“that has paid him a share of Bain’s profits ever since” his retirement). 
 73. See Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 465, 468–69 (2009) (discussing the recent trend toward selling portions of 
management companies of private equity firms through IPOs); Brian Cheffins & John Armour, 
The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2008) (same). These private equity funds 
include many of the most prominent funds, including Blackstone Group, L.P., KKR & Co., L.P., 
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transactions effectively turn managers’ interests in future management 
fees and carried interest into a currently tradeable stock that can be 
sold to the public. This means that the public, which obviously has no 
association with the investment management of these funds, now 
holds a substantial interest in these funds’ carried interest.74 By taking 
management companies public, private equity managers effectively 
diversify away the risk that they face in managing a fund, diluting the 
incentive associated with carried interest. This dilution occurs because, 
instead of going to the people actively managing a fund, the carried 
interest goes to a broad, generally passive group of investors. 
The apparent trend toward less carried interest going to those 
choosing and managing investments on a day-to-day basis calls into 
question claims by scholars and the industry that carried interest 
creates an alignment of interests. Those who are most responsible 
for generating value in a particular fund receive less of the profit 
they create than is commonly realized, and therefore have less 
incentive to maximize value. This changes incentives in important 
ways that scholars and regulators need to grapple with, since 
economic incentives are supposedly the bedrock of private equity 
alignment of interests.  
Although carried interest arrangements in an increasing number 
of private equity funds have reduced the amount of compensation paid 
to the funds’ active managers, at least a portion of carried interest 
generated in most funds is still paid to those tasked with day-to-day 
management. The remainder of this Part discusses the incentives 
surrounding carried interest to show that even when carried interest 
is paid to active managers it creates a complicated set of incentives that 
do not necessarily align the interests of investors and managers. 
 
Apollo Global Management, LLC, Oaktree Capital Group, LLC, and The Carlyle Group, L.P. 
These funds were able to do this through a quirk in the IPO rules that allowed them to conduct 
an initial public offering without being required to do so through a corporation. By qualifying 
as a “publicly-traded partnership” these funds were able to sell shares in a partnership rather than 
a corporation, thereby retaining the preferential tax treatment of carried interest and avoiding 
the added level of corporate taxation generally required by public companies. See, e.g., Victor 
Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89, 89–93 (2008); Gladriel Shobe, Paying for Tax 
Assets in an IPO (working paper) (on file with the author). 
 74. Under the comparison of carried interest to options in an ordinary company, this 
would be the equivalent of a CEO selling a portion of their future income from the company, 
whatever that may be, to the public. 
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 b. Carried interest and the multiplication of funds. The structure 
of carried interest provides an incentive for private equity firms to alter 
the way they organize their funds. In recent years it has become 
common for managers to create many different funds rather than 
growing a single fund bigger and bigger.75 One possible explanation 
for this is that creating various smaller funds rather than one big fund 
generates a substantial economic benefit to managers because of the 
lack of netting across funds, meaning that managers get carried 
interest when a fund performs well without reduction for any losses in 
other funds.76 This benefit can be significant and essentially allows 
managers to silo their risk by creating funds that invest in different 
sectors or geographic regions and forcing investors to bear the entire 
risk of poor performance in those individual funds. It is common for 
investors to invest in various funds by the same manager, so the benefit 
to managers of using many smaller funds can be significant. Carried 
interest can affect not only managers’ incentives within a particular 
fund but also how they choose to structure their fund platforms. 
B. Alignment of Interests and the Structure of Carried Interest 
The structure of carried interest misaligns the interests of 
managers and investors in several ways. First, in some instances it 
rewards managers even when they exert less than the optimal amount 
of effort. Second, it can encourage managers to engage in behaviors 
that entail too little or too much risk relative to the risk preferences 
and expected returns of investors. Third, managers can use their 
control of a fund to manipulate how much carried interest they receive 
and when—often in ways that are not in the best interests of 
investors.77 This section analyses how and when carried interest creates 
these issues under various fund performance scenarios. 
 
 75. For an example of the number of funds managed by a large investor, see The Carlyle 
Group, Corporate Private Equity, http://www.carlyle.com/our-business/corporate-private-
equity/us-buyout (last visited Oct. 3, 2016) (listing thirteen different types of funds, generally 
focusing on different geographic areas). 
 76. See SCHELL, supra note 17, § 4.01 (“The formation of multiple General Partner 
entities avoids subjecting a potentially valuable asset, the carried interest from one fund, to the 
claims and obligations that could arise from a second fund.”). 
 77. See Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture 
Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP: LINKING 
GOVERNANCE WITH REGULATORY POLICY 54, 56 (Ashgate/Dartmouth ed. 2001). Professors 
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1. Carried interest when performing well 
It is generally believed that as the value of a fund increases 
significantly beyond the eight percent preferred return, carried interest 
continues to properly align incentives, since the manager receives a full 
twenty percent of future gains. As one scholar put it, “the incentive 
never disappears or decreases, no matter how high the profits.”78 To 
say that the manager’s incentives do not change when a fund is 
performing well misses the nuances of how this compensation 
structure affects managers’ incentives with respect to risk. When a 
fund first begins, the manager has little to lose economically if a fund 
performs poorly, since they do not bear any downside risk other than 
for their own capital interest. When a fund is performing well, the 
manager has already accrued carried interest and will get twenty 
percent of any future gains because they no longer have to worry 
about the preferred return. This changes the manager’s risk profile in 
an important way. At this point, the manager continues to earn twenty 
percent of profits, but also effectively bears twenty percent of losses 
because of the clawback.79 Because the manager faces both upside and 
downside, it is more likely to make investments that provide an 
appropriate expected return for the amount of risk they are 
undertaking. In this way, interests are apparently aligned when a fund 
is performing well. 
 
Klausner and Litvak also discuss conflicts that may arise with respect to managers departing at 
an inopportune time, but this potential conflict is less relevant to the analysis here. 
 78. Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for 
Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 284 (2007) [hereinafter Illig, 
What Hedge Funds Can Teach]; see also Illig, Promise of Hedge Fund Governance, supra note 70, 
at 71 (“[B]ecause the manager’s ability to share in the profits never dissipates, no matter how 
successful the fund, neither do the incentives.”). 
 79. For example, if the manager has built up $100 of expected carried interest, then they 
should be expected to be more risk averse than when the fund first started and they had no 
carried interest built up. They bear 20% of losses in the first scenario but nothing in the second 
scenario, but gains benefit them in both. If the fund were to earn an additional $500 of profit, 
then the manager would get an additional $100 in both scenarios. However, if the fund were to 
lose $500, then the manager would have a clawback obligation of $100 under the first scenario, 
while in the second scenario they would only owe $10, since the clawback cannot exceed the 
amounts of carried interest received. 
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2. Carried interest when performing poorly 
Some scholars have noted that when a fund is performing poorly, 
the manager has an incentive to act in riskier ways to try to recover 
losses and earn carried interest.80 This incentive is created by the 
limited duration of funds. The fact that funds have a relatively short 
life span is generally discussed only as a benefit to investors because it 
provides an opportunity to exit.81 However, carried interest 
compensation structures also make this short duration a detriment at 
times to investors because it also provides an automatic exit for 
managers. This is because fees are netted within a fund but not across 
funds. So, if an investor pays significant carried interest and then 
invests in a subsequent fund with the same manager that loses money, 
or vice versa, there is no mechanism to equalize their return over time 
and force the manager to pay back a portion of the carried interest. 
Although managers have an incentive to take greater risk when a 
fund is performing poorly, it is also possible that carried interest 
becomes unlikely enough that the benefit of actively managing a fund 
to make risky management decisions is outweighed by the incremental 
costs that are required to do so. In all likelihood, when a fund is 
performing poorly the manager has a greater incentive to avoid 
spending more time on the fund than is necessary.82 Recall that 
managers work on more than one fund at a time. Halfway through 
the life of one fund, a manager is already working on the next fund, 
so when a fund is performing poorly the manager has greater incentive 
to invest time in the second fund, since the prospect of earning carried 
 
 80. Field, supra note 46, at 19 n.60; Fleischer, Missing Preferred Return, supra note 3, at 
95 n.78 (“Anytime the carry is out of the money, the VC will have an incentive to take more 
risk than is optimal from the investors’ point of view.”); Sahlman, supra note 28, at 499; Illig, 
What Hedge Funds Can Teach, supra note 78, at 284 (“[A] straight carried interest, without 
more, could encourage excessive risk taking, especially when a fund’s activities are yielding a 
loss.”); Illig, Promise of Hedge Fund Governance, supra note 70, at 73 (noting a concern that “a 
straight carried interest could encourage excessive risk-taking whenever a fund’s activities are 
yielding a loss”). 
 81. See Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 12, at 299; Morley, supra note 3, at 
1246; Harris, supra note 43, at 279–80 n.92–95 and accompanying text. 
 82. For example, if a fund has 10 investments worth a total of $1 billion and the current 
value of the investments is $800 million, then, with the preferred return, they would have to 
have unrealistically high returns to make any money. So in this scenario it is highly unlikely that 
they will make any carried interest, no matter how much risk they take on, and it would require 
significant effort to engage in risky behavior. 
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interest in the subsequent fund is much higher.83 Although from a 
risk/reward perspective it makes sense for managers to make risky 
investments in a poorly performing fund, the concern when a fund is 
performing poorly is likely to be less about how much risk managers 
take and more about the amount of effort they put in. When carried 
interest is no longer realistically obtainable, it loses its value to 
motivate management to align its interests with investors and may in 
fact work against investor interests. 
3. Carried interest when performance is neutral 
When fund performance is neutral, a manager’s risk incentives lie 
somewhere between those created when a fund is performing poorly 
and when a fund is performing well. In this case, neutral means the 
point at which the manager has hit the preferred return, but currently 
has accrued no carried interest; each subsequent dollar earned will 
generate carried interest. Like when a fund is performing poorly, 
managers have an incentive to make risky investments when 
performance is neutral because they have nothing to lose. However, 
managers have less incentive to make excessively risky investments 
when fund performance is neutral than when the fund is performing 
poorly because they are close to earning carried interest and excessively 
risky investments could move them away from that point. On the 
other hand, managers have more incentive to take risks when fund 
performance is neutral than when a fund is performing well, since they 
do not have any carried interest to lose. This means that when fund 
performance is neutral the risk preferences of investors and managers 
are more closely aligned than when a fund is performing poorly, but 
likely less aligned than when a fund is performing well. From an effort 
perspective, when fund performance is neutral managers have a strong 
incentive to put in effort to actively manage a fund well so that they 
can earn carried interest. In this regard, the carried interest seems to 
align effort interests well. 
 
 83. Fleischer, Missing Preferred Return, supra note 33, at 95 (“A GP might even abandon 
a fund with early strikeouts or pay little attention beyond the minimum needed to justify 
acceptance of the management fee.”). 
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4. Issues with the clawback 
The discussion about economic incentives to this point has mostly 
talked about fund performance in one direction—either up, down, or 
neutral. However, the nature of these funds is such that there is no 
limit to the direction the value a fund’s portfolio can move from day 
to day. A fund can have significant gains in its first few years and then 
significant losses in later years, or vice versa. This creates an issue 
because the manager is sometimes able to earn carried interest early in 
the life of a fund before it is clear whether the fund will generate a 
profit sufficient to merit the payment of carried interest in those 
amounts. This is where the clawback comes in. 
The purpose of the clawback is to restore the proper economic 
sharing arrangement at the end of a fund’s life, once all investments 
have been disposed of and it is clear how much the fund gained or lost 
in the aggregate. As discussed above, a clawback is much more 
necessary in a deal-by-deal waterfall because the manager receives 
carried interest distributions much earlier in the fund’s life cycle, 
before it is clear whether the fund as a whole will be successful.84 In a 
return-of-all capital waterfall, it is rare that the clawback will be 
relevant.85 The existence of a clawback creates its own agency costs, so 
the distinction between the two types of waterfalls becomes very 
important here. 
The agency costs that arise under a deal-by-deal waterfall are 
generally not in the form of misaligned risk or effort incentives, but 
arise because deal-by-deal waterfalls allow managers to manipulate 
when they receive carried interest, and in what amounts—often in 
ways that are not in the best interest of investors. This manipulation is 
possible because a fund often has a mix of profitable and unprofitable 
investments. A deal-by-deal waterfall allows the manager to time when 
these investments are sold such that the manager receives payments of 
carried interest even though if the entire fund was liquidated, no 
carried interest would be due. Although the clawback will fix this 
overpayment at the end of the life of a fund, this can come many years 
later, during which time investors have essentially provided the 
 
 84. See supra Section II.A.2. 
 85. Id. 
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manager with an interest-free loan.86 Managers have a strong incentive 
to delay the winding up of a fund to avoid having to pay back under 
the clawback so they can keep this interest-free loan for as long as 
possible.87 The existence of a clawback many years away is therefore 
not enough to fully align investor and manager interests.88 
Another issue with the clawback from an alignment of interests 
perspective is that the clawback does not require managers to return 
100 percent of their carried interest, which can create an actual cash 
benefit to the manager, and not just a timing benefit. The clawback is 
calculated net of taxes paid by the manager, under the theory that the 
manager already had to pay the taxes and should not have to pay back 
more cash than it received. However, this reasoning is dubious. First 
of all, these clawbacks commonly use an assumed tax rate for all 
recipients of carried interest regardless of their actual tax status. This 
assumed rate is often calculated based on the highest theoretical rate 
that could be applied to any person within the manager entity, or 
based on the highest combined city, state, and federal rate in New York 
City.89 Because the assumed tax rate reflects the highest amount that 
anyone could theoretically pay, many recipients of carried interest may 
get to keep significantly more than they paid in taxes.90 While using an 
assumed rate keeps the clawback relatively simple, it does so at the 
expense of the investors and does not reflect the reality of the 
manager’s tax situation. 
 
 86. For example, if in year two of a ten-year fund, the manager receives a distribution of 
$100 of carried interest and then in year five the economy enters a recession and it becomes clear 
that the funds’ investments are very unlikely to generate carried interest on a net basis, the 
manager still is able to hold on to their $100 for at least another five years. 
 87. Harris, supra note 43, at 277 (“The fund manager may use her informational 
advantage and discretion to evade the mandatory distribution provisions until such time as 
distribution is in the fund manager’s (but not necessarily investors’) best interest.”); Litvak, 
Venture Capital LPAs, supra note 3, at 170–71 (noting that venture funds are able to determine 
when to sell investments and distribute proceeds from those investments to investors). 
 88. Some funds use mechanisms to reduce, but not eliminate, this issue, either by 
requiring the manager to put a portion of their carried interest in escrow or by having more than 
one clawback throughout the life of the fund to reduce the timing benefit, although many funds 
have neither of these. 
 89. See Field, supra note 46, at 22 n.68. 
 90. Field, supra note 46, at 26 (“Typically, fund agreements use either a particular rate 
that is stated in the agreement (such as 15 percent) or a rate that is determinable for a 
hypothetical taxpayer under a set of assumptions that are articulated in the fund agreement.”). 
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The clawback also rarely accounts for any tax benefit created by 
the clawback obligation.91 The clawback obligation creates a 
deduction that managers can use against current and future capital 
gains.92 Recall that managers work for multiple funds at one time, 
meaning that they have various current and future sources of income 
against which they will almost certainly be able to deduct the loss. 
Recent increases to the taxation of capital gains have made this benefit 
more significant to managers, while also reducing the efficacy of the 
clawback for investors.93 All of this is done under a theory of simplicity, 
but this simplicity works in favor of managers in all circumstances, and 
therefore provides incentives for managers to maximize their receipt 
of carried interest even when they know they are likely to be subject 
to a clawback. 
5. The effect of the overall economy on incentives 
Another misalignment in interests can arise because the incentives 
created by carried interest are not relative to the performance of the 
overall economy. When the overall economy is performing well, 
managers receive the same amount of carried interest for high returns 
as they would if the overall economy was performing poorly. The 
values of private equity funds’ investments are substantially affected by 
the broader economy.94 Because managers must achieve a fixed 
preferred return (generally eight percent) that is uncorrelated to the 
overall economy before they can earn carried interest, managers have 
 
 91. See, e.g., Stephanie R. Breslow, Selected Excerpts from PLI’s Private Equity Funds: 
Formation and Operation, 1st ed., Chapter 2: Terms of Private Equity Funds, 1782 PRACTISING 
L. INST. CORP. L. & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK 225 at § 2.8.1[G][4] (2010) (noting that 
requiring the manager to pay tax benefits back to the fund that it receives from the clawback is 
“often resisted by general partners because it involves an analysis of personal tax returns”). 
 92. See I.R.C. § 1211. 
 93. The rate of taxation on capital gains has recently increased from 15% for 20% for the 
highest earners. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act also added a new 3.8% tax on 
“net investment income,” which brings the highest marginal rate on capital gains to 23.8%. See 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). That 
means that the amount that the manager is required to pay back under many clawback provisions 
would now be less than 70% of the amount of carried interest they received, when state, local, 
and federal capital gains taxes are included. This has made the corresponding deduction that 
managers receive from a clawback obligation much more valuable. 
 94. See, e.g., Ludovic Phalippou & Maurizio Zollo, What Drives Private Equity Fund 
Performance? (2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/
05/0541.pdf (finding that private equity fund performance correlates with both business cycles 
and stock market cycles). 
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an incentive to take greater risk when the overall state of the economy 
is poor because they have to significantly outperform the market to 
earn carried interest. This means that even if the stock market has lost 
significant value, a manager still must earn an eight percent return to 
earn carried interest even though something significantly below an 
eight percent return would be an improvement over what investors 
could have earned by investing broadly in the stock market. Yet there 
is no reason to expect that investors would want managers to take 
greater risks when the economy is poor, and indeed they might prefer 
that managers take less risk since their concern might shift to capital 
preservation rather than expansion in times of poor 
economic conditions. 
The structure of carried interest also means that when the overall 
economy is performing well, a manager has an incentive to take less 
risk since it is virtually guaranteed to earn significant carried interest 
as long as it merely tracks the performance of the overall economy. 
The existence of an eight percent preferred return becomes irrelevant 
when the economy is performing very well, even though a fund’s 
positive performance is at most partially attributable to the manager’s 
own performance. Yet there is no reason to believe that an investor 
would want a manager to make lower risk investments just because the 
overall economy is performing well. 
C. Improving Carried Interest Terms to Align Incentives 
This Part has shown that the economic incentives created by 
carried interest are misaligned to a degree in all circumstances, but 
that this misalignment is worst when a fund is performing poorly. 
Although scholars have not fully analyzed the complex incentives 
created by carried interest, it may be that investors understand the 
ways that carried interest gives managers incentives to extract more 
value from private equity funds and that investors find this 
misalignment acceptable under the circumstances. However, given 
how complex these incentives are, and how few mechanisms investors 
have negotiated to avoid them, it is likely that many investors may not 
fully understand how carried interest affects managers’ incentives. The 
fact that many of the largest institutional investors are not able to even 
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say how much carried interest they pay lends support to the idea that 
many investors do not understand the complexity of carried interest.95  
This section proposes a number of ways to improve the structure 
and transparency of carried interest. A few scholars have 
recommended moving toward a private equity compensation system 
with lower management fees and higher carried interest to align 
interests and reduce agency costs.96 As the earlier sections of this Part 
have shown, such a shift would be an incomplete solution because it 
would compound the agency costs in existing carried interest 
structures. Reducing agency costs requires more targeted changes 
that address the specific issues and structures that cause the 
underlying misalignment. This section explores possible changes that 
would improve the alignment of interests and protect investors who 
do not fully understand the agency costs created by the private equity 
structure. 
1. Fee transparency 
One way to improve transparency and increase investors’ ability to 
understand the economic incentives underlying their investments in 
private equity funds would be to improve the disclosure of fees 
charged by these funds.97 This recently became an issue when the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the 
country’s largest state pension fund, admitted that it could not say 
how much it had paid in fees to private equity managers. Many found 
it surprising when CalPERS said these fees were “not explicitly 
disclosed or accounted for. We can’t track it today.”98 When requested, 
some managers even refused to disclose to CalPERS the amount of 
 
 95. See Alexandra Stevenson, Calpers’s Disclosure on Fees Brings Surprise, and Scrutiny, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2015, at B5; Clark, supra note 15; Morgenson, supra note 15. 
 96. See Paul A. Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. FIN. 
ECON. 133, 154 (1996); Bankman & Cole, supra note 21, at 231. 
 97. Fee disclosure is also important because there are many hidden fees private equity 
managers charge that go beyond carried interest and management fees. Ludovic Phalippou, 
Beware of Venturing into Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 147 (2009). These fees, commonly 
known as transaction and monitoring fees, are charged indirectly to portfolio companies for 
services private equity mangers provide to these companies. These fees are especially opaque, 
and managers have tried for many years to keep them out of investors’ consciousness. 
 98. Stevenson, supra note 95. 
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carried interest paid.99 The fact that many investors do not know how 
much they pay in fees makes it impossible for them to understand how 
managers can use the economic terms of an LPA to their advantage. 
This, of course, is in the managers’ interests. 
Increased disclosure of fees would be most helpful if done in a 
standardized way. Currently, no uniform system exists for reporting 
fees, which makes it difficult for investors to compare fees across 
different managers.100 All managers could be required to send a 
statement that clearly explains current and cumulative fees for each 
fund with their quarterly statements, which would make fees more 
salient and easier for investors to understand. The Institutional 
Limited Partners Association has very recently proposed doing 
exactly this by creating their own template for reporting fees.101 The 
purpose behind uniform reporting efforts is to force managers to 
detail their fees in a standardized way to reduce tracking burdens,102 
but it would also be an important tool to increase awareness of fees, 
which is the first step in understanding how fee structures affect 
managers’ incentives. 
2. Disclosing where carried interest goes 
As described above, it has become common for a significant 
portion of carried interest to be paid to retired partners, upper-level 
managers who aren’t involved in management decisions, and even to 
the public, through IPOs of management entities. These 
arrangements are generally opaque to everyone other than the 
managers earning these fees. Even when investors receive accurate and 
timely reporting of fees, managers do not disclose where the carried 
 
 99. Dawn Lim, Calpers Asks for Disclosure on Fees Charged to Portfolio Companies, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2015, 3:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/08/18/calpers-
asks-for-disclosure-on-fees-charged-to-portfolio-companies/. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Reporting Template, INSTITUTIONAL LIMITED PARTNERS ASS’N, 
https://ilpa.org/best-practices/reporting-best-practices/for-consultation-ilpa-fee-reporting-
template/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
 102. Id. (“The aim of this proposed template is to encourage increased uniformity in the 
disclosures being provided to LPs. This will benefit the industry in two ways: 1. Providing LPs 
with an improved baseline of information that lends itself to more streamlined analysis and 
informed internal decision making 2. Reducing the compliance burden on GPs, who face a 
variety of bespoke template formats.”). 
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interest goes, even to investors who specifically request it.103 The first 
step in more closely tying pay to those who do the work is to disclose 
where carried interest goes.104 Regulators could require private equity 
funds to disclose high-ranking employees’ pay from each fund in the 
same way they do for public companies.105 This way, investors will 
know whether they can rely on the incentive provided by carried 
interest to align incentives. Once investors have this information, they 
can negotiate with managers to ensure that fees go to those 
responsible for generating returns, or at least can make a conscious 
decision to allow payments to go elsewhere even though it reduces the 
alignment of interests. Greater disclosure would also open these 
compensation packages up to greater scrutiny by the public, which is 
the first step toward potential legislative or regulatory solutions to the 
misalignment caused by carried interest. 
3. Eliminating the deal-by-deal waterfall 
As shown in Section II.B, the deal-by-deal waterfall causes 
significant misalignment of interests that are not present when a 
return-of-all-capital waterfall is used. A manager’s ability to receive 
early distributions under a deal-by-deal waterfall misaligns incentives 
without providing any benefit to investors. The only justification for 
this mode of distribution is that the manager needs a steady source of 
income throughout the life of a fund, but the two percent 
management fee—and the fact that at any given time managers receive 
compensation from multiple funds at various stages of their life 
cycles—calls this justification into question. Because deal-by-deal 
waterfalls distribute carried interest to managers relatively early in the 
life of a fund, they frequently create a need for a clawback, which 
creates substantial complexity and many of its own opportunities for 
manager misbehavior. From an alignment of interests perspective, 
managers should always be required to return investors’ money before 
they can receive payments of carried interest. This would force 
managers to take a longer-term approach to their investment strategy 
 
 103. MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 42, at 41–42 (noting that many managers refuse to 
provide details of internal compensation structures). 
 104. See INSTITUTIONAL LTD. PARTNERS ASS’N, PRIVATE EQUITY PRINCIPLES 6 (2011), 
https://ilpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ILPA-Private-Equity-Principles-version-2.pdf. 
 105. See Fast Answers: Executive Compensation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N , 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/execomp.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
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and give them less opportunity to manipulate their own 
compensation. This, of course, is a change that could only happen if 
investors were to recognize the issues and negotiate to eliminate this 
type of waterfall. 
4. Fixing clawbacks 
For funds with a deal-by-deal waterfall, a number of changes could 
be applied to the clawback to better align incentives. The way 
clawbacks are currently constructed is problematic for a number of 
reasons. Clawbacks may cause managers to game the timing of 
disposition of investments, do not require managers to return all of 
the overpayments of carried interest, and give managers an incentive 
to delay liquidation of a fund to avoid the clawback. Some funds 
attempt to address these problems by including interim clawbacks in 
the middle of the life of a fund. Interim clawbacks are only a partial 
solution, since they still create all of the problems described above, 
just for a shorter (but still potentially long) period. Another partial 
solution used by a relatively small number of funds is to require that a 
portion of the carried interest be put into escrow until it becomes clear 
that a clawback will not be necessary.106 
Beyond interim clawback and escrow accounts, investors could 
also charge interest on amounts subject to a clawback in order to 
reduce managers’ incentives to delay paying back the interest-free loan 
created by the overpayments of carried interest. Clawbacks could also 
be changed to require managers to pay back larger amounts. Recall 
that clawbacks are generally net of taxes, calculated in a way that is 
favorable to managers. Instead of using hypothetical tax rates, funds 
could calculate each carried interest recipient’s rate and could account 
for any tax benefits the managers receive from the tax loss created by 
the clawback.107 This creates complexity for managers, but because all 
of these provisions work in their favor, it would seem fair for them to 
bear the cost created by this complexity. Alternatively, if simplicity is 
the goal, managers could make no deduction from clawback 
obligations for taxes, since the tax liability and offsetting deduction 
when a clawback is required should net out in the end. Any timing 
 
 106. Escrows often require a manager to pay only a relatively small portion of carried 
interest into the escrow account, so the other incentives created by the clawback discussed in 
this Article still exist, just with a smaller overall dollar amount. SCHELL, supra note 17, § 2.04. 
 107. INSTITUTIONAL LTD. PARTNERS ASS’N, supra note 104, at 17. 
3.SHOBE.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017  9:10 AM 
1437 Misaligned Interests in Private Equity 
 1471 
cost from paying tax earlier than when the deduction is received is 
offset by the fact that the manager had the benefit of the interest-free 
loan from investors. 
To reduce the length of time that managers are able to keep excess 
carried interest, a clawback calculation could also be made every time 
there is a disposition of an investment rather than only at the end of a 
fund’s life. This would force the fund to recalculate its cumulative 
performance at the time of each disposition and would require the 
manager to pay back overpayments of carried interest at the time it 
first becomes clear that they have been paid too much, rather than 
waiting until many years down the line. Funds track their performance 
regularly and provide quarterly and annual reports to investors, so this 
would not be a significant administrative burden. Calculating 
clawbacks upon each disposition would reduce managers’ ability to 
benefit from the misalignment of interests that arise from the deal-by-
deal waterfall structure. While the adoption of clawbacks at the time 
of each disposition would not eliminate fund managers’ discretion to 
time disposition to their advantage, it would mitigate the timing 
problems created by clawback structures in most private equity LPAs. 
5. Netting returns across funds 
A solution to many of the agency problems that are unique to 
private equity would be to net returns across subsequent funds for 
investors who invest in subsequent funds. As already discussed, the 
fact that private equity managers’ carried interest resets every ten years 
is the cause of many of the agency costs described previously. In funds 
that are performing poorly, managers have incentives to take more risk 
than is optimal and to give less than their best effort. Netting returns 
across funds would require managers to take a longer-term view of 
fund performance.108 Managers would have an incentive to minimize 
losses in a current fund, even if the fund still ended with a negative 
overall performance, since the greater the loss the more it would 
reduce carried interest in the subsequent fund. This would therefore 
 
 108. This type of clawback would reduce overall compensation to managers, since under 
the current system there is no netting, so losses therefore disappear at the end of the life of a 
fund. If the goal was simply to reduce agency costs while maintaining the same amounts of 
overall fees, then investors could provide for a compensating increased rate of carried interest in 
a case where a prior fund generated a loss. 
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serve to better align risk and effort incentives in a fund that is 
performing poorly.109 Of course, managers would likely demand 
higher fees to compensate for the carried interest they lose from not 
being able to start fresh with each fund. That would be fine, since the 
proposal here is to align interests, not to reduce compensation. 
Netting across funds would not be without issues, since a poor 
performance in a fund can severely limit managers’ prospects of 
earning carried interest in future funds, and therefore their incentive 
to work hard and make sound investment decisions in the current fund 
and future funds. Some hedge funds have found an approach to both 
provide an incentive to managers whose funds have lost value while 
also providing investors their full share of profits in the long run. 
Hedge funds are different from private equity funds in that they are 
open-ended, without a required termination date like private equity 
firms have.110 This means that hedge fund managers do not get a fresh 
start on earning carried interest every ten years. These hedge funds 
have a mechanism to ensure that the lack of a termination date does 
not remove the alignment of interests where a fund is performing 
poorly.111 When a hedge fund has lost value, this mechanism, 
commonly called a “modified high-water mark,” typically allows the 
manager to be paid half of its carried interest, or ten percent in the 
usual scenario of twenty percent carried interest, until the fund has 
recovered two times its losses.112 For example, if an investor invested 
$100 in a hedge fund with this type of modified high water mark, and 
his or her investment went down to $50, then the manager would still 
earn carried interest on subsequent gains, but at a reduced 10% rate 
until the investment went up to $150. At this point the manager 
 
 109. Applying a clawback across funds would also reduce the issues raised by the fact that 
investors must choose whether to reinvest with a manager halfway through the life of a fund 
before it is clear how the fund as a whole will perform. The issues raised by delayed exit rights 
in private equity funds are described in more detail in Part III below. 
 110. PRACTICAL L. CORP. & SEC., KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HEDGE FUNDS AND 
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: COMPARISON CHART (2016). 
 111. See DAVID P. STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE 
FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY: THE NEW PARADIGM 277 (2010) (describing the modified high-
water mark as a way to align interests by allowing managers to earn carried interest even when a 
fund is negative). 
 112. See, e.g., John Jannarone, The Tide Goes Out for Hedge-Fund Fees, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
9, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123655347985565659 (describing the 
compensation structure of hedge funds that use “a ‘modified’ high-water mark that lets it collect 
incentive fees in any winning year, even if it comes after a losing period”). 
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would have received $100 x 10%, or $10 of carried interest. The end 
result is that the manager received the same amount of carried interest 
as it would have if it were taking a 20% carried interest only to the 
extent of profit (which would be 20% of $50, or the same $10). This 
arrangement more closely aligns incentives and also reduces the fund 
manager’s incentive to close the fund and move on to something 
else.113 A similar approach would work for private equity funds that 
have an overall negative return, since the same investors commonly 
invest in subsequent funds by the same manager.114 These funds could 
implement this compensation scheme at the beginning of the 
subsequent fund so that managers would begin receiving carried 
interest, at a reduced rate, as soon as they would have received it 
without this type of clawback. 
6. Fixing the preferred return 
As discussed in Section II.A, the preferred return is a very blunt 
tool for aligning incentives because it does not account for overall 
economic conditions. The preferred return could be adjusted so that 
it is relative to the returns of the S&P 500 or some other index 
relevant to the investment strategy of different types of funds that 
reflects the return an investor could have earned by investing directly 
in the stock market or through low-fee investment funds like mutual 
funds. This would reduce managers’ incentives to take unnecessary 
risk when the overall market is performing poorly, since it would allow 
them to earn carried interest by outperforming the market rather than 
outperforming an arbitrarily set number, like an eight percent 
preferred return. It would also reduce managers’ incentives to become 
overly conservative in times of good economic performance, since 
they would not earn carried interest just because the overall economy 
was doing well. 
 
 113. This structure allows managers to be paid earlier than they would be in a more typical 
compensation structure. See, e.g., id. 
 114. STEPHANIE R. BRESLOW & PHYLLIS A SCHWARTZ, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: 
FORMATION AND OPERATION § 2.1.6 (2015) (“A fund sponsor whose first fund performed well 
may find itself negotiating with many of the same investors in subsequent funds.”); Rosenberg, 
Two Cycles, supra note 22, at 421 (“Like all businessmen who rely on repeat customers, the best 
venture capital firms consistently behave in ways designed to induce their limited partners to 
invest in subsequent funds raised by the same firm.”). 
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D. Management Fees 
On top of carried interest, investors pay an annual management 
fee for the investment services of the manager. This fee is unrelated to 
performance and is instead calculated through a formula with two 
elements, a rate and a base against which that rate is applied. The 
management fee rate is most commonly around two percent,115 but 
the base against which the fee is applied can vary from fund to fund 
and within a fund. At the inception of a fund, the base used is generally 
committed capital.116 Funds use committed capital as the base, rather 
than contributed capital, because the manager spends significant time 
and effort sourcing investments during the investment period before 
all capital has been contributed. Otherwise, the manager would 
receive no management fee before the first investment was made, even 
though this can be the busiest time for a fund trying to find ways to 
invest its committed capital. It is common for buyout funds to reduce 
the management fee by either reducing the rate charged or changing 
to a reduced base, or both, after the investment period under the 
theory that once all investments are made the amount of time a 
manager needs to spend on the fund goes down, and even more so as 
investments are sold off.117 Also, at this point the manager can begin 
to raise a new fund, which will provide a new management fee and will 
occupy a significant portion of the manager’s time.118 
 
 115. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 16, at 2311. 
 116. Id. at 2309–10 (noting that after the investment period 84% of buyout funds changed 
the basis they charged management fee against, 45% of these funds changed the rate they charge, 
and 39% changed both). A possible variation on a straight committed capital base is to reduce 
the base by the amount of any realized investments before the end of the investment period, 
because a quick sale of a portfolio company proportionally reduces the amount of time and effort 
the manager needs to dedicate to the fund. It is also possible to subtract expenses out from the 
base on the theory that investors should not pay management fee on amounts called down to 
pay expenses, including previous management fees. See SCHELL, supra note 17, § 2.05. 
 117. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 16; Joseph W. Bartlett & W. Eric Swan, Private Equity 
Funds: What Counts and What Doesn’t?, 26 J. CORP. L. 393, 398–99 (2001); Litvak, Venture 
Capital LPAs, supra note 3, at 169–71. 
 118. Professor Litvak claims that this reduction “makes no sense” because traditional 
companies pay salaried employees the same wage in busy and nonbusy times. Litvak, Venture 
Capital LPAs, supra note 3, at 171. However, the comparison is not an apt one because fund 
managers work for more than one fund at a time. The question is how the “salary” is apportioned 
among the various funds for which they work. It certainly makes sense, and seems fair, to pay 
managers less once they have started another fund, and therefore have another income stream, 
and have started spending less time on the current fund because of the new fund. 
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As commentators have noted, because the management fee bears 
no relation to fund performance, it is a poor mechanism by which to 
align incentives of managers and investors.119 The management fee is 
generally thought of as necessary to cover a manager’s basic internal 
costs of operating a fund such as salaries, rent and other office 
expenses, investment research, travel, and bookkeeping.120 However, 
there is no direct connection between fees charged and expenses 
incurred.121 As a fund’s size increases, or the number of funds managed 
grows, economies of scale increase the difference between the cost of 
operations and management fees paid to the manager.122 The fact that 
the management fee is often a guaranteed source of profit that 
increases with fund size creates an incentive for managers to engage in 
empire building—either by making each fund bigger or by creating 
more funds—to increase their profit. 
The management fee, combined with limited investor exit rights 
and carried interest, affects both a manager’s effort incentives and a 
manager’s incentives to hold on to investments to delay the 
liquidation of a fund. During the investment period, which generally 
covers the first half of the life of a fund, almost all funds charge 
management fees based on committed capital. However, after the 
investment period, it is common for this amount to be reduced to 
either a percentage of actual invested capital or a reduced percentage 
of committed capital. The formula a fund uses influences manager 
incentives during the second half of the life of a fund. 
For a fund charging management fees only on assets currently 
invested, managers have an incentive to delay the exit of investments 
when the fund is performing poorly, since they will not receive carried 
 
 119. Fleischer, Missing Preferred Return, supra note 3, at 96 (“The management fee also 
fails to provide a strong incentive to work hard.”). 
 120. See Bartlett & Swan, supra note 117, at 398. 
 121. Litvak, Venture Capital LPAs, supra note 3, at 172 (“[N]one of my agreements pegs 
the management fee to the actual fund expenses that the fee covers. Moreover, nearly all of my 
agreements specify expenses that limited partners have to pay in addition to the 
management fee . . . .”). 
 122. Morley, supra note 3, at 1233 (“[F]und managers can achieve economies of scope 
and scale by simultaneously managing multiple funds.”); Sahlman, supra note 28, at 500 (“With 
respect to scale economies, it seems likely that unit costs decline with the absolute size of the 
venture-capital pool under management because there are a number of fixed (or near-
fixed) costs . . . .”). 
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interest.123 Managers also have an incentive to draw down all of the 
capital committed by investors when they expect a fund not to 
generate carried interest, even if they expect investments to have 
subpar returns. For a fund charging management fees based on a 
declining percentage of the fixed capital commitments, the managers 
do not have an incentive to delay the exit of specific investments, since 
their fee is based on a set, but declining, amount rather than amounts 
invested. However, managers still have an incentive to keep the fund 
running as long as possible, or at least until the management fee 
percentage declines to zero. 
The fact that the management fee is a set percentage, rather than 
directly tied to expenses, also gives the managers incentive to minimize 
effort and expenses to increase profit from the management fee. The 
less a manager spends on operating expenses the greater source of 
profit the management fee becomes. This misaligns managers’ and 
investors’ effort incentives, since investors would generally prefer that 
a manager put more effort into managing a fund. 
Managers’ incentives from the management fee can be 
counteracted by carried interest. Whether carried interest is likely to 
do so depends on how a fund is performing. When a fund is 
performing poorly, carried interest is less likely to counteract a 
manager’s incentives to put less effort into a fund to maximize the 
profit from the management fee because further effort and 
expenditures would be unlikely to generate carried interest, even if 
the extra effort could significantly reduce losses or create gains that 
are insufficient to generate carried interest. When a fund is 
performing poorly, carried interest is also less likely to counteract a 
manager’s incentives to manipulate timing of liquidations to 
maximize carried interest. This is because managers have no accrued 
carried interest, so they have no incentive to liquidate investments 
sooner so that they can receive their portion of carried interest. They 
also do not have to worry about the preferred return continuing to 
accrue on outstanding capital.124 
When a fund is performing well, carried interest is more likely to 
counteract the misalignment created by the management fee. In this 
 
 123. Harris, supra note 43, at 278 (“[T]he fund managers might delay liquidating a 
position in order to continue to receive a lucrative management fee for this investment . . . .”). 
 124. See supra Section II.A.1. 
3.SHOBE.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017  9:10 AM 
1437 Misaligned Interests in Private Equity 
 1477 
circumstance, the manager has an incentive to work hard since they 
earn carried interest on each incremental dollar of profit.125 The 
potential of earning carried interest counteracts the manager’s 
incentive to give less than full effort to maximize profit from the 
management fee. Carried interest also counteracts a manager’s 
incentive to hold on to investments to maximize management fees. A 
manager only receives carried interest as investments are sold, so the 
manager’s desire to be paid carried interest counteracts the desire to 
hold on to investments to keep getting management fees. Also, the 
preferred return continues to accrue to the extent capital remains 
outstanding, which provides managers an incentive to liquidate 
investments and distribute funds to stop the preferred return from 
accruing. When a fund is performing well, carried interest works to 
offset at least some of the misalignment created by management fees. 
E. Improving the Management Fee 
A number of scholars have proposed reducing management fees 
and replacing them with higher rates of carried interest that are tied 
to performance.126 However, a reduction of the management fee 
accompanied by an increase in carried interest would only 
compound the issues raised by carried interest. Any proposals for 
reform would need to consider changes to both forms of manager 
compensation simultaneously. 
Simply reducing the rate charged for management fees would not 
solve the underlying issues with management fees described above, 
although it would reduce them. The best way to structure 
management fees—though it would receive strong pushback from 
managers given the profitability of flat fees—would be to base 
 
 125. There is a trend toward including the management fee as a fund expense when making 
the carried interest determination, which effectively reduces the value of the management fee. 
See SCHELL, supra note 17, § 2.02 (“There appears to be an increasing trend to include 
Management Fees as an expense for purposes of profit calculations.”). This happens because 
when the fund is in the positive, the manager effectively bears 20% of the management fee, since 
the management fee is considered an expense and therefore reduces profits, which reduces 
carried interest. For example, if a fund acquired only one asset for $100 and sold that asset for 
$150 five years later, and $10 of management fees was paid during those five years, the profit on 
which carried interest would be calculated would be $40, not $50. So the manager would get 
$8 of carried interest instead of the $10 they would have received if they had been paid no 
management fee. 
 126. See Gompers, supra note 96; Bankman & Cole, supra note 21, at 231. 
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management fees on managers’ actual internal expenses.127 This 
expense-based approach would put management fees in line with their 
intended purpose—ensuring that managers have enough to pay their 
basic expenses to run their fund.  
Charging management fees based on actual expenses would be 
more complicated than the current flat fee system because it would 
require managers to create a budget of expenses to be approved by 
investors or the advisory committee on an annual basis.128 It may be 
worth doing this despite the added complication because an expense-
based fee would reduce or eliminate most of the negative aspects of 
the management fee. It would remove managers’ incentives to work 
less to reduce expenses as a way of maximizing income from the 
management fee when a fund is performing poorly. It would also 
reduce their incentives to build larger funds, or more funds, since any 
benefits from economies of scale would reduce their management fee 
rather than increase their profits. And it would reduce the incentive to 
hold investments longer than necessary. Requiring management fees 
to track managers’ expenses would be a big step toward reducing the 
misalignment of interests in private equity.129  
F. The Manager’s Capital Interest 
Another mechanism private equity funds use to align investor and 
manager interests is to require managers to contribute some of their 
own capital to the fund to ensure that they have “skin in the game.”130 
 
 127. MERCER REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 (noting that using a negotiated budgeted 
expense amount to determine management fee was “viewed very negatively from the majority 
of general partners”); SCHELL, supra note 17, § 2.05 (“Recent public offerings of firms that 
sponsor and advise private equity funds have, among other things, cast a spotlight on 
Management Fees since they often represent a material portion of the revenue and net income 
of the firm attempting to sell shares to the public.”). 
 128. Because most managers run multiple funds at the same time, and a number of 
expenses are not directly attributable to a single fund, this would require managers to apportion 
expenses across funds. 
 129. This would, of course, reduce a manager’s income. Once again, the purpose of this 
Article is not to propose ways to reduce a manager’s income but rather to better align incentives. 
A manager could make up for this lost income by charging a set fee to investors without the 
problematic incentives created by the management fee. The point of this discussion is to point 
out that there are ways to better align interests even if levels of compensation are static. 
 130. Louis Lowenstein, Searching for Rational Investors in a Perfect Storm, 30 J. CORP. L. 
539, 553 (2005); Illig, Promise of Hedge Fund Governance, supra note 70, at 73 (“[F]und 
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The amount contributed by the manager varies by fund but is 
frequently around one percent, though it can occasionally be 
substantially more.131 This capital contribution is generally thought to 
serve as a way of alleviating agency costs by putting the manager in 
the same position as an investor in the fund.132 
We can question how much influence a small equity interest in a 
fund really has on a manager. Managers receive substantial 
management fees that frequently amount to more on a yearly basis 
than their required capital investment, and therefore seven or eight 
times their capital investment over the life of the fund.133 Also, recall 
that the manager receives a significant portion of other investors’ 
profits in carried interest but bears none of their losses. The incentives 
provided by carried interest and management fees appear to be much 
stronger than those provided by the typical manager’s capital interest 
in a fund. 
Some have argued that to more closely align incentives, funds 
should meaningfully increase the required manager capital interest.134 
While this argument sounds appealing on its surface, increasing the 
required manager capital interest is not without complication, and 
there is a question of whether investors would really want this. It 
would take a very significant investment by a manager to counteract 
the incentives provided by management fees and carried interest.  
While small manager capital contributions do little to change a 
manager’s incentives either way, large ones could affect them 
significantly. A manager entity that makes the contribution is 
 
managers have typically been required to invest a significant portion of their personal wealth in 
their funds alongside other investors.”). 
 131. JOSH LERNER ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY: A CASEBOOK 98 
(5th ed. 2012) (noting that a one percent contribution is most common but that amounts vary); 
Investors, BAIN CAPITAL PRIVATE EQUITY, http://www.baincapitalprivateequity.com/
about/investors/alignment-with-LPs (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (“Collectively, 8-10% of our 
private equity funds’ commitments come from our professionals, far in excess of industry 
convention and reflective of our strong principal investor mentality and confidence in our ability 
to generate industry-leading returns. We believe this creates a strong alignment of interests with 
our LPs.”). 
 132. Harris, supra note 43, at 287; Sahlman, supra note 23, at 499 (“One final contractual 
response to the problem of risk is to force the general partner to invest more in the fund than 
the customary small amounts mentioned earlier.”). 
 133. See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 16. 
 134. MULCAHY ET. AL, supra note 42, at 40 (describing current amounts of GP capital 
commitments as “grossly insufficient”). 
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composed of individuals with varying degrees of wealth. Requiring 
these individuals to tie up what might be a large portion of their 
personal wealth in a fund could make them very risk averse, which may 
cause them to act contrary to investors’ preferences.135 Investors are 
generally very large endowments, pension funds, and insurance 
companies that hold a broad array of diversified assets.136 Investors 
generally think of their private equity assets as relatively risky and 
accept that risk in hope of higher returns.137 While the current 
amounts that most managers contribute are unlikely to significantly 
affect their decision making, if they are required to make much larger 
investments they may become “more risk averse than [investors] 
would want them to be.”138 A larger investment by the manager may 
do some good but can only go so far in aligning incentives on its own. 
G. Summary of Economic Incentives 
This Part has attempted to unpack the complex economic 
incentives that exist in private equity funds and the issues these 
complex incentives can create. For those investors and regulators 
looking to improve upon this system, this Part makes some tentative 
proposals about how private equity compensation could be structured 
in ways that have lower agency costs, but there are certainly many 
other methods to do so. Either way, we need to contend with the full 
complexity of incentives inherent in private equity structures in our 
analyses and proposals relating to these funds. 
 
 135. See SCHELL, supra note 17, § 4.01 (“Junior Principals and, in some cases, one or more 
of the Senior Principals may not have the financial resources necessary to provide a share of the 
General Partners Capital Commitment to the Fund which is proportionate to their shares of the 
Carried Interest.”). 
 136. Harris, supra note 43, at 260, 287. 
 137. Felix Barber & Michael Goold, The Strategic Secret of Private Equity, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Sept. 2007, at 53, 57 (“Private equity funds are illiquid and are risky because of their high 
use of debt; furthermore, once investors have turned their money over to the fund, they have 
no say in how it’s managed. In compensation for these terms, investors should expect a high rate 
of return.”). 
 138. Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 12, at 293; see also Iman Anabtawi, Some 
Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 584–85 (2006) (making 
a similar point with respect to executives in public companies). 
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III. MANAGER REPUTATION AND INVESTOR EXIT RIGHTS 
Many have noted that reputational concerns induce managers to 
behave in ways that are aligned with investor interests.139 Reputation 
is important because of the relatively short-term nature of private 
equity funds. These funds last around ten years, and when one fund 
ends, managers need to start another so they can continue earning 
fees. Reputation plays an essential role in determining whether 
investors will choose to reinvest with the same manager and whether 
new investors will sign on.140 Investors essentially have an exit option 
when it comes time to decide whether to reinvest, albeit one that is 
delayed compared to publicly traded companies and other types of 
investment funds, like mutual funds and hedge funds.141 
Reputation is generally synonymous with performance. By far the 
most salient factor to investors is the return on their investment. This 
makes it difficult to distinguish the incentives created by reputational 
concerns from the incentives created by performance fees, since both 
 
 139. See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 24, at 240; Armour et al., supra note 31, at 
42–43; Elizabeth Cosenza, Co-Invest at Your Own Risk: An Exploration of Potential Remedial 
Theories for Breaches of Rights of First Refusal in the Venture Capital Context, 55 AM. U. L. 
REV. 87, 100–02 (2005); Gilson, Engineering Venture Capital Market, supra note 44, at 1090 
(discussing the operation of the “reputation market” as a constraint on risk-taking behavior); 
Masulis & Thomas, supra note 3, at 239–40 (describing reputation as an important way to 
curb misconduct by managers); Morley, supra note 3, at 1263 (“[E]xit enhances the power 
of reputational penalties. Redemption rights and periodic liquidations force fund managers 
constantly to seek new investors.”); Rosenberg, Two Cycles, supra note 22, at 424 (“The most 
powerful control mechanism over the relationship between investors and venture capitalists is 
an implicit agreement that is not legally binding over either party.”); Sahlman, supra note 28, 
at 494 (“Implicitly, the investors also preserve the right not to invest in any later fund 
managed by the same venture capitalists.”); George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in 
the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 309 (2001) (arguing that managers 
know that their future success depends on “building and preserving a reputation, and this 
further constrains opportunism”). 
 140. Gilson, Engineering Venture Capital Market, supra note 44, at 1090 (“A [manager’s] 
track record . . . is the [manager’s] principal tool for persuading investors to invest in successor 
funds.”); Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, supra note 49, at 395 (quoting 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital 
and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 865, 886 (1997)) 
(“[T]he short life of limited partnerships virtually guarantees that the venture capitalists will 
undergo a ‘periodic performance review’ at the hands of their current investors who are, 
inevitably, potential future investors as well.”). 
 141. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and 
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 88–89 (2010) (describing ways 
in which exit rights in mutual funds are superior to exit rights in ordinary companies). 
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are an incentive to increase returns because they both produce benefits 
for the manager. However, this Article has strived to show that a desire 
to perform well is not sufficient to align incentives under the complex 
and nuanced set of incentives in private equity. This Part extends this 
analysis to reputational concerns and argues that exit rights in private 
equity funds are weak. To the extent exit rights exist, they are less 
effective at aligning interests than scholars have realized. 
A. Exit 
Private equity funds allow for complete exit, but only around every 
ten years.142 In the interim, investors are mostly locked into a fund. 
Investors’ money is tied up for much longer in these funds than in 
other investment funds like mutual funds and hedge funds. The 
opportunities to punish managers by exiting are therefore much 
weaker in private equity funds. Some scholars have argued in favor of 
a more robust secondary market for private equity funds to allow for 
greater exit opportunities, which they argue could help discipline 
managers.143 However, the issue is not the lack of a secondary market, 
but rather the way the secondary market works. When investors in a 
private equity fund want to sell their interests, they must sell directly 
to a buyer who assumes all the seller’s obligations to the fund, 
meaning that the sale does not affect the manager in any way.144 This 
exit right is very different from selling shares of a publicly traded 
company. When investors sell shares in a publicly traded company the 
stock price goes down, directly impacting the managers’ 
compensation, which is tied substantially to stock performance. In a 
private equity fund, the manager’s compensation and powers are not 
affected in any way by a transfer, even if investors have to sell at a steep 
 
 142. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 3, at 222 (noting that virtually all private equity funds 
are established for ten year terms); Rosenberg, Two Cycles, supra note 22, at 426 (also noting 
that private equity funds are usually established for ten year terms). 
 143. See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? 
Investment Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 45 (2009) (arguing that 
“advisors and investors should work together to create a vibrant secondary market”). Secondary 
markets have become more robust in recent years, although there are certain tax rules that limit 
the extent to which these funds are able to be traded. 
 144. An investor in a private equity fund can only transfer its interest with the manager’s 
consent and must also enter into a transfer agreement with the fund. The transfer agreement 
requires the purchaser to assume all of the obligators of the seller and requires that the seller and 
purchaser indemnify the manager and fund for any costs that arise as a result of the transfer. 
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discount on the secondary market. Thus, this type of exit does not 
directly harm the manager. 
Exit decisions are especially delayed in private equity funds because 
of the unique nature of exit in these funds. Because a manager 
commonly raises a new fund once the investment period has expired, 
(generally about halfway through the life of an existing fund) investors 
likely have to decide whether to exit by choosing not to invest in the 
subsequent fund when the existing fund still has at least five years until 
it is dissolved.145 The last five years of a fund are when most 
investments are realized and when fund performance becomes clear. 
Before this, investors have only financial statements with the 
managers’ (inevitably optimistic) estimates of investment performance 
during a period when many of the investments will have been held for 
only a short period. At this point it is most likely unclear how well a 
fund actually has and will perform. Investors are therefore forced to 
make their decisions to reinvest before they are able to know if they 
are satisfied with a manager’s performance.146 
Another issue with this delayed form of exit is that the manager 
has a significant period of time in which to favor reinvesting 
investors. For example, suppose that Fund 1 has fifty investors, and 
twenty-five of them choose to invest in Fund 2 along with twenty-
five new investors. Fund 2 is more important to the manager than 
Fund 1 since the manager is more likely to convince continuing 
investors to reinvest in subsequent funds. The performance of Fund 
2 is more important in successfully creating a Fund 3. The manager 
can therefore favor Fund 2 by putting more effort into Fund 2 or 
resolving conflicts in favor of Fund 2.147 Fund 2 investors who are 
also in Fund 1 should be indifferent since they are concerned about 
the combined returns of the two funds. Fund 1 investors that already 
declined to reinvest are stuck with these conflicts for many years until 
they are able to actually exit. 
 
 145. Gilson, Engineering Venture Capital Market, supra note 44, at 1071 (noting that 
fund managers raise subsequent funds about halfway through the life of the existing fund, or 
around five years); Harris, supra note 43, at 280. 
 146. See Morley, supra note 3, at 1254 (“By the time private equity investors become 
dissatisfied, a fund’s life may be largely over.”). 
 147. See, e.g., Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 143 (describing conflicts that arise 
when a manager’s different funds invest at different levels of the same portfolio company’s 
capital structure). 
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B. Reputation and Fund Performance 
Much like with economic incentives, the incentives provided by 
reputational concerns are not static. This section explains how the 
effectiveness of reputational concerns in aligning interests varies 
depending on how a fund is performing. 
1. Reputation when performing poorly 
When a fund is performing poorly, the manager’s reputation is 
already damaged. In this scenario, reputational concerns are unlikely 
to be an effective mechanism for controlling manager behavior 
because managers know they may not be able to raise another fund, 
and so they have an incentive to maximize their own profit in the 
poorly performing fund. Because most funds start a new fund with at 
least five years remaining in the life of the current fund,148 managers 
know far in advance whether they will be able to successfully raise a 
subsequent fund. If fundraising goes poorly, a manager has a long, and 
crucial, period of a fund’s life in which it does not have reputational 
concerns as a strong incentive.149 During this time the manager can 
maximize its own well-being by using its discretion under the 
partnership agreement to create benefits for itself. Even the SEC has 
noticed this problem, citing to cases where managers have extended 
the life of a fund when managers clearly will not be able to raise a 
subsequent fund, essentially creating a “zombie” fund that continues 
to pay management fees even though it would be in investors’ best 
interests to liquidate the fund.150 
Reputational concerns when a fund is performing poorly may 
also increase the misalignment of interests. Managers have an 
incentive to take risks when their reputation is poor because the 
 
 148. Gilson, Engineering Venture Capital Market, supra note 44, at 1071. 
 149. Andrew J. Bowden, Dir., Off. of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, Speech at 
the Private Equity International, Private Fund Compliance Forum 2014: Spreading Sunshine in 
Private Equity (May 6, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014—
spch05062014ab.html (“These managers may increase their monitoring fees, shift more 
expenses to their funds or try to push the envelope in their marketing material by increasing 
their interim valuations, sometimes inappropriately and without proper disclosure.”). 
 150. Id. (“[W]e continue to see ‘zombie’ advisers, or managers that are unable to raise 
additional funds and continue to manage legacy funds long past their expected life. These 
managers are incentivized to continue to profit from their current portfolio even though that 
may not be in the best interest of investors.”). 
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benefit of possibly salvaging their reputation is higher than the risk 
of further tarnishing an already damaged reputation. Managers have 
less to lose, economically and reputationally, when a fund is already 
performing poorly.151 
2. Reputation when performing well 
One issue with relying on reputational penalties as a substitute for 
contractual protection is that when a fund is performing well, 
reputational concerns for a manager decrease. Investors, because they 
are relatively passive, base their opinions of manager reputations on 
performance figures, especially when a fund is performing well and the 
decision to reinvest is a foregone conclusion. Managers know this, so 
when a fund is performing well, the manager knows that investors are 
likely to be satisfied regardless of whether the manager uses its 
discretion under the partnership agreement to behave in ways that 
advantage itself over investors, because investors are unlikely to be 
watching very closely.152 
3. Reputation when performance is neutral 
Concerns about reputation are most effective at aligning interests 
when fund performance is relatively neutral. This is the case early in 
the life of a fund, when fund performance is uncertain and a manager 
is trying to establish, or maintain, a good reputation by working hard 
to produce good returns and appear effective to investors. If a fund’s 
performance is neutral later in the life of the fund, investors are likely 
considering whether or not to invest in future funds and therefore 
are likely watching the manager more closely. When fund 
 
 151. See Field, supra note 46, at 24 (“Troubled fund performance, by itself, creates adverse 
reputational consequences. Thus, query to what extent the possibility of additional market 
sanctions is likely to affect the GP’s risk-taking choices.”); Harris, supra note 43, at 291 
(“[P]rivate equity limited partnership agreements are long and detailed formal arrangements.”). 
 152. One important example of how managers can take advantage of investors is by 
charging fees to portfolio companies for the manager’s services. These fees, commonly called 
transaction fees and monitoring fees, are entirely controlled by the manager and reduce returns 
to investors because they reduce the value of portfolio companies. See supra note 97. In many 
funds the manager is able to keep all, or a significant portion of, these fees, even though the fees 
they are directly related to what the manager is they already compensated for in the fund. When 
a fund is performing well, a manager likely feels more emboldened to charge higher amounts of 
these fees, since the accompanying reduction in performance will not will not harm the 
manager’s their ability to continue to attract investors, and because satisfied investors are less 
likely to complain about these fees. 
3.SHOBE.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017  9:10 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1486 
performance is neutral, managers’ incentives are more likely to work 
in investors’ favor. 
C. Summary of Exit Rights 
Exit is not as effective of a tool at aligning the interests of managers 
and investors as is generally assumed. Exit is often a weak alignment 
tool in private equity funds because of the long periods between exit 
opportunities and because investors have to decide very early whether 
to commit to reinvest with a particular manager. When exit rights do 
exist, they create a complicated and varied set of incentives for 
managers that do not always help to reduce agency costs, especially 
when a fund is performing poorly but also when a fund is performing 
well. It appears that the combination of manager compensation and 
reputational concerns is not enough to eliminate the significant agency 
costs present in the private equity structure. 
CONCLUSION 
The finance world is going private, mostly driven by the growing 
presence of the private equity industry. Yet legal academics remain 
focused almost entirely on agency costs in public companies. Because 
private equity funds are so different from public companies, it is worth 
examining the complex array of agency costs in the private equity 
market and why they exist. This Article has aimed to open up the 
internal relationships between private equity managers and investors 
to greater inspection by considering the agency costs that arise in 
private equity funds, which allow managers to transfer more value to 
themselves than many realize. The Article shows that the interests of 
managers and investors in these funds are commonly misaligned, but 
how misaligned the interests are depends on the types of 
compensation structures used and the performance of a fund. 
Although investors may consciously accept these agency costs, given 
the complexity of the private equity compensation structure, many 
investors have likely overlooked at least some of these costs. This 
Article explores how private equity contracting may provide less 
protection to investors than it may appear on its face and makes 
proposals to better align incentives of managers and investors. 
 
